State v. Tart, 372 N.C. 73

In March 2014 Jermaine Tart stabbed volunteer Richard Cassidy at a homeless shelter; Cassidy survived serious, life‑threatening injuries. Tart admitted the stabbing but disputed that he had specific intent to kill due to long‑standing mental illness.
Tart was indicted on attempted first‑degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury; jury convicted on both counts.
The attempted murder short‑form indictment used the phrase "attempt to kill and slay...with malice aforethought," mixing statutory language associated with manslaughter ("slay") and murder ("malice aforethought").
On appeal the Court of Appeals vacated the attempted first‑degree murder conviction for an insufficient indictment but affirmed the assault conviction, and rejected Tart’s claim that prosecutorial remarks required the trial court to intervene ex mero motu.
The State sought discretionary review; the North Carolina Supreme Court considered (1) whether the short‑form indictment was facially sufficient to confer subject‑matter jurisdiction and (2) whether certain prosecutor statements in closing were so grossly improper that the trial court erred by not intervening sua sponte.

Issue	State's Argument	Tart's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of short‑form indictment for attempted 1st‑degree murder	Indictment alleging "attempt to kill and slay...with malice aforethought" sufficiently states murder because inclusion of "malice aforethought" supplies the essential murder element; synonyms do not defeat adequacy	Using the manslaughter word "slay" instead of "murder" renders the short‑form defective and thus the trial court lacked jurisdiction	Indictment was sufficient: presence of "malice aforethought" functionally alleged murder; reverse Court of Appeals and reinstate conviction
Prosecutor remarks in closing; duty to intervene ex mero motu	Remarks (e.g., labeling Tart a "homicidal, manipulative, sociopath," warning he'd be "unleashed" on the streets, and asserting non‑delusional motives) were supported by record and expert testimony; arguments sharpened issues and rebutted diminished‑capacity theory	Remarks were inflammatory, appealed to fear/prejudice, and in part relied on events proven not to have occurred; trial court should have intervened sua sponte and a new trial is required	No abuse of discretion by trial court in failing to intervene ex mero motu where Tart made no contemporaneous objection; remarks not so grossly improper to render proceedings fundamentally unfair; Court of Appeals affirmed on this point (concurrence would have granted new trial)

State v. Thomas, 236 N.C. 454 (definition of indictment as written accusation)
State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325 (constitutional purposes of indictments: identify charge, prevent double jeopardy, enable preparation and sentencing)
State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117 (standards for proper closing arguments; limits on prosecutorial argument)
State v. Dalton, 369 N.C. 311 (impropriety where prosecutor argued possibility of quick release of defendant with mental illness)
State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294 (prosecutorial remarks must have materially prejudiced defendant to warrant relief)
State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198 (remarks assessed in context and overall factual circumstances)
State v. Matthews, 358 N.C. 102 (name‑calling and improper argument can require reversal)
State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243 (dehumanizing comparisons and fear appeals condemned)
State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103 (definition of specific intent to kill)
State v. Rankin, 821 S.E.2d 787 (disfavoring rigid technical quashings of indictments)