State v. T. Morales, 468 P.3d 355

Tristan James Morales was charged with one count of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (rape of his 8‑year‑old niece); he pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.
During in‑chambers voir dire, prospective juror R.C. disclosed that her sister, foster children she grew up with, and a close friend had been sexually abused as children and initially said she didn’t think she could set those experiences aside.
After extended questioning by the district judge and prosecutor explaining the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and defendant’s right not to testify, R.C. stated she could follow the law and be fair.
The district court denied Morales’s challenge to strike R.C. for cause; Morales used a peremptory strike on R.C. and exhausted his peremptory challenges.
Morales was convicted and sentenced; he appealed, arguing the denial of the for‑cause challenge was an abuse of discretion and, because he exhausted peremptories, requires automatic reversal (structural error).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Morales’s challenge to strike R.C. for cause	State: No abuse — R.C. ultimately and convincingly assured she could follow the law and set aside personal experiences, and the court’s open questioning properly clarified misconceptions	Morales: R.C.’s spontaneous statements showed a disqualifying state of mind; her later monosyllabic assurances were coaxed and unreliable	No abuse of discretion — court reasonably relied on the totality of R.C.’s answers and her ultimate assurance she could be impartial
Whether erroneous denial (if any) requires automatic reversal because Morales exhausted peremptory challenges	Morales: Exhaustion of peremptories after a wrongful denial is structural error requiring reversal	State: No structural error here because denial was not erroneous	Not reached as an error — court held denial was not an abuse, so no structural error relief warranted

State v. Anderson, 397 Mont. 1, 446 P.3d 1134 (reversed denial where juror repeatedly reaffirmed bias despite later assurances)
State v. Johnson, 395 Mont. 169, 437 P.3d 147 (improper rehabilitation by leading questions; juror’s spontaneous bias required removal)
State v. DeVore, 292 Mont. 325, 972 P.2d 816 (juror partiality may be shown by circumstantial evidence; ‘fixed opinion’ is only one aspect of state‑of‑mind inquiry)
State v. Cudd, 375 Mont. 215, 326 P.3d 417 (deference to trial court where juror, despite similar experience, convincingly affirmed ability to be impartial)
State v. Champagne, 371 Mont. 35, 305 P.3d 61 (upholding denial where juror initially unsure but then avowed she would follow instructions and be impartial)