325 Conn. 793
Conn.2017Background
- In May 2008 police searched the defendant Swebilius’ hotel room and seized computer media; forensic analysis was not returned until April 2, 2013.
- An arrest warrant was issued May 9, 2013 (within the five-year statute of limitations), but the warrant was executed only after the limitations period expired when Swebilius voluntarily surrendered on June 10, 2013 — a 32‑day delay from issuance to execution.
- At the trial motion-to-dismiss hearing, the defendant presented uncontested evidence that he lived openly and was available for arrest throughout the statutory period; the state presented no evidence explaining the delay.
- The trial court denied the motion, concluding a 32‑day delay was not unreasonable as a matter of law; the Appellate Court affirmed relying on precedent that short delays can be per se reasonable.
- The Supreme Court granted certification and reversed the Appellate Court, holding that reasonableness is fact‑specific and that, once a defendant shows availability, the state must justify post‑expiration delays.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Swebilius' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a short delay between issuance and execution of an arrest warrant (32 days, executed after the statute expired) can be reasonable as a matter of law | Some brief delays are de minimis and require no justification; burden remains on defendant to prove unreasonableness | Crawford disallows any per se short‑delay rule; once defendant shows availability the state must justify delay | Held: No per se rule; reasonableness is fact‑specific and when defendant proves availability the burden shifts to the state to justify the delay |
| Proper allocation of burdens when a defendant shows availability for arrest | Crawford places burden on defendant to prove delay unreasonable; state argued Soldi/Woodtke conflict with Crawford | Defendant: once availability shown, burden shifts to state to show due diligence | Held: Burden shifting of Soldi/Woodtke is consistent with Crawford; once defendant shows availability, state must present evidence of due diligence |
| Whether Kruelski allows courts to treat very short delays as reasonable per se | Appellate Court relied on Kruelski to treat 32‑day delay as per se reasonable | Defendant: Kruelski should not establish a per se exception to Crawford | Held: Kruelski, to extent it created a per se short‑delay rule, is overruled; cannot treat brief delays as automatically reasonable |
| Remedy where trial court applied incorrect legal standard and state presented no justification for delay | State argued trial court’s common‑sense finding was adequate; no further proof needed | Defendant sought dismissal because of lack of state justification | Held: Remanded for hearing; trial court’s legal standard was incorrect and state must be allowed to present evidence explaining delay |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443, 521 A.2d 1034 (Conn. 1987) (statute tolled by warrant issued within limitations only if executed without unreasonable delay; reasonableness is fact‑specific)
- State v. Soldi, 92 Conn. App. 849, 887 A.2d 436 (Conn. App. 2006) (when defendant proves availability, burden shifts to state to show delay was reasonable)
- State v. Woodtke, 130 Conn. App. 734, 25 A.3d 699 (Conn. App. 2011) (applies burden‑shifting: defendant’s nonelusiveness shifts burden to state to show due diligence)
- State v. Kruelski, 41 Conn. App. 476, 677 A.2d 951 (Conn. App. 1996) (held one‑day post‑expiration delay reasonable as matter of law; Court here disapproved that per se approach)