State v. Sweat, 34,260

Early-morning May 5, 2013: surveillance cameras at the Super 8 Motel recorded a dark pickup arriving, a person peering into and forcibly entering vehicles, and that person leaving in the pickup; similar damage was later found on other vehicles at the Comfort Inn.
Police linked a dark-colored pickup to Defendant Alree Sweat, saw him near a disabled pickup, and conducted surveillance; officers observed a man (identified at trial as Sweat) at the Comfort Inn smashing car windows, abandoning a white Mustang, and fleeing on foot.
Detective Rickards recognized Sweat in stills and on video based on many prior interactions; at trial he testified he was "100 percent" certain Sweat was the person in the surveillance footage. Defense did not object to that identification testimony.
Defendant was convicted of four counts of burglary of a vehicle (NMSA 1978, § 30-16-3(B)). He appealed, arguing (1) the grainy surveillance video was inadmissible, (2) lay witness identification invaded the jury province, (3) insufficiency of the evidence, and (4) violation of his speedy-trial right.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, unpreserved identification testimony for plain error, sufficiency of the evidence de novo viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and declined to address the speedy-trial claim because it was not raised below.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Sweat)	Held
Admissibility of grainy surveillance video	Video was relevant to show arrival/departure, clothing, gait, and removal of items; probative value outweighs prejudice	Video quality was so poor it lacked probative value and was unfairly prejudicial	Admit video: probative (vehicle movement, clothing, gait, removal of property) and no substantial unfair prejudice found
Lay witness (Detective) identification from video	Detective had extensive familiarity with defendant and could reliably identify him; testimony helpful under Rule 11-701	Identification invaded the jury’s province and provided no special basis for reliability	No plain error: adopt Thompson factors; Detective was more likely than jury to ID Sweat given prior interactions and changes in appearance
Sufficiency of evidence for burglary convictions	Evidence (video, ownership of similar pickup, flight, statements about items) supports convictions for both motels and specific vehicles	Video not dispositive; conflicting testimony about whereabouts/ownership; no recovered stolen property	Convictions affirmed: evidence, when viewed favorably to verdict, was sufficient for Super 8 and Comfort Inn counts; jury could reject contrary evidence
Speedy-trial claim	N/A at trial; raised on appeal	Delay between indictment and trial violated constitutional right	Not reached: claim forfeited by failure to obtain a district-court ruling; nothing for appellate review

State v. Downey, 145 N.M. 232 (2008) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
State v. Gonzales, 145 N.M. 110 (2008) (grainy surveillance video can be probative: body type, clothing, gait)
People v. Thompson, 49 N.E.3d 393 (Ill. 2016) (factors to determine when lay witness ID from surveillance is admissible)
State v. Henderson, 100 N.M. 260 (1983) (photographs as "silent witness")
State v. Carpenter, 374 P.3d 744 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016) (sufficiency assessed against statutory elements despite instructional errors)
State v. Valdez, 109 N.M. 759 (1990) (appellate courts decline speedy-trial review when issue not raised below)
State v. Rojo, 126 N.M. 438 (1999) (contrary evidence supporting acquittal is not a basis for reversal)