State v. Sullivan
333 P.3d 1201
Or. Ct. App.2014Background
- Officer Burke developed probable cause that defendant had driven intoxicated with his seven-year-old son; defendant fled into his apartment and shut the door.
- Burke, other officers, and dispatch were on scene; dispatch reported defendant had a concealed weapons permit.
- Burke yelled orders; defendant pushed his son into the apartment, shut blinds and lights, and did not respond to knocks.
- After consulting with his sergeant, Burke kicked the apartment door in, entered with guns drawn, and arrested defendant; defendant later refused chemical testing.
- At suppression hearing the state relied on exigent circumstances: (1) risk to the child, (2) dissipation/destruction of BAC evidence, and (3) hot pursuit (raised later on appeal).
- Trial court rejected the dissipation rationale for lack of proof a warrant could not be obtained but accepted the child-safety exigency; Court of Appeals reversed that child-safety holding and also rejected extending Machuca to justify a warrantless home entry for BAC dissipation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether child-safety exigency justified warrantless home entry | Circumstances (yelling, pushing child inside, shutting blinds, CW permit) made it objectively reasonable to believe child was in imminent danger | No articulable facts showed imminent threat of serious harm; speculation insufficient | Rejected: facts did not support objectively reasonable belief of imminent serious harm to child |
| Whether dissipation of BAC justified warrantless home entry (destruction-of-evidence exigency) | Machuca makes alcohol evanescence an exigency such that state need not show a warrant could not have been obtained quickly | Roberts/Kruse require proof a warrant could not be obtained without sacrificing evidence; Machuca should not displace that in home-entry context | Rejected for home-entry: state must show feasibility/timing of obtaining warrant before excusing entry |
| Whether Machuca’s rule for blood draws applies to home entries/arrests | Machuca’s evanescent-evidence principle applies generally to intoxication evidence and related intrusions | Machuca was limited to warrantless blood draws from already-seized suspects; home entry is a greater intrusion and requires stricter showing | Rejected: Machuca does not control home-entry cases because home invasions are far more intrusive |
| Whether the trial court erred in denying suppression overall | State argued alternate exigency (dissipation) could support affirmance | Defendant challenged both child-safety and dissipation grounds | Court reversed: trial court erred to the extent it upheld entry on child-safety; state failed to meet burden on dissipation for a home entry |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Machuca, 347 Or 644 (Ore. 2010) (blood-alcohol evanescence ordinarily constitutes exigency permitting warrantless blood draw in hospital/seized-suspect context)
- State v. Roberts, 75 Or App 292 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (state must prove officers could not have obtained warrant before alcohol dissipated to justify warrantless home entry)
- State v. Kruse, 220 Or App 38 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (applied Roberts; state failed to show time to obtain warrant was unreasonable for DUII home entry)
- State v. Baker, 350 Or 641 (Or. 2011) (articulable facts needed for emergency-aid exception under Article I, section 9)
- State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231 (Or. 1988) (warrantless home entries are per se unreasonable absent established exceptions)
- State v. Milligan, 304 Or 659 (Or. 1988) (warrantless blood draws may be justified where alcohol is dissipating unless a warrant could be obtained without sacrificing evidence)
- State v. Moylett, 313 Or 540 (Or. 1992) (held dissipation alone insufficient; state also had to show warrant could not be promptly obtained—later disavowed in Machuca)
- State v. Heintz, 286 Or 239 (Or. 1979) (limited hospital blood draw treated as a minor intrusion when justified to preserve evanescent evidence)
- State v. Fair, 353 Or 588 (Or. 2013) (government intrusion into home is the most significant privacy invasion under Article I, section 9)
- Stevens v. State, 311 Or 119 (Or. 1991) (definition of exigent circumstances requiring swift police action)