State v. Stubby, 122872

Defendant Joshua Matthew Stubby pled guilty to two counts of felony stalking and two misdemeanor violations of a protection-from-abuse order; the State agreed to recommend the lowest grid number and not oppose concurrent sentences.
The plea agreement and plea colloquy warned Stubby the court was not bound by the agreement, could impose consecutive sentences, and that sentencing would depend on his criminal history; felony exposure was stated as 5–17 months and misdemeanors up to 12 months.
A presentence investigation (PSI) converted several person misdemeanors into person felonies, raising Stubby’s criminal history score to B and increasing his expected sentencing range.
Stubby moved before sentencing to withdraw his plea, alleging his attorney assured him he would receive the low (five-month) sentence and likely probation; new counsel was appointed before the withdrawal hearing.
At the withdrawal hearing Stubby testified he relied on counsel’s assurances but admitted the plea colloquy had warned him of the 5–17 month range and that sentencing would depend on criminal history; the district court found his plea knowing and voluntary, denied withdrawal, but granted a dispositional departure to probation with an active 14-month sentence suspended.

Issue	Stubby’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Whether counsel’s alleged misadvice about sentencing/criminal-history conversion is good cause to withdraw a plea pre-sentence	Counsel misprojected conversions; Stubby relied on assurances he would get five months/probation, so plea was not fairly made	Plea agreement and colloquy warned sentencing depends on criminal history; only Stubby’s testimony supports mistake; no mutual-party reliance	Denial affirmed — no abuse of discretion; plea was knowingly and voluntarily made
Whether a mutual mistake about criminal-history score (like in Schow) requires withdrawal	Conversion of misdemeanors to felonies produced a different CH score than Stubby expected, warranting withdrawal	No on-the-record mutual expectation about CH score; unlike Schow, parties did not negotiate based on a projected score	Schow distinguished — mutual mistake finding absent, so Schow does not control
Whether lackluster counsel (not ineffective) can support withdrawal under Edgar factors	Even if counsel’s advocacy was weak, it produced a material misunderstanding about sentence exposure	Court emphasized plea warnings and Stubby’s acknowledgement; Edgar factors not met	Edgar factors weighed against withdrawal; defendant failed to meet burden

State v. Frazier, [citation="311 Kan. 378, 461 P.3d 43"] (2020) (abuse-of-discretion standard for plea-withdrawal review)
State v. Edgar, [citation="281 Kan. 30, 127 P.3d 986"] (2006) (three-factor test for evaluating good cause to withdraw a plea)
State v. Schow, [citation="287 Kan. 529, 197 P.3d 825"] (2008) (mutual mistake about criminal-history score may warrant withdrawal when parties negotiated based on that score)
State v. Schaefer, [citation="305 Kan. 581, 385 P.3d 918"] (2016) (Edgar factors are benchmarks; courts may consider other facts)
State v. Moses, [citation="280 Kan. 939, 127 P.3d 330"] (2006) (defendant must be made aware of the consequences of a plea)