State v. Struble
2017 Ohio 9326
Ohio Ct. App.2017Background
- On March 30, 2016, Mentor police surveilling retail parking lots observed Max S. Struble and three others make multiple store trips; officers followed them after observing suspicious conduct.
- Struble bought two boxes of pseudoephedrine (Sudafed) at Target; shortly after he and a co-occupant purchased drain cleaner at Lowe’s.
- During a traffic stop minutes later officers found two small bags of white powder (tested methamphetamine) and a straw on Struble; other occupants had meth pills, a torch, and an empty Sudafed box.
- Struble was indicted for illegal assembly/possession of chemicals to manufacture drugs (R.C. 2925.041), aggravated possession, and possessing criminal tools; he was convicted on all counts and sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 60 months.
- On appeal Struble argued (1) improper admission of an NPLEx report of his past pseudoephedrine purchases, (2) improper expert testimony on intent, (3) denial of his mid-trial Faretta request, and (4) that the illegal-assembly conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Struble) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Admission of NPLEx report (business records/hearsay) | Report was admissible and any error harmless because other evidence supported intent to manufacture | Report was hearsay without proper foundation under Evid.R. 803(6)/business- records exception; admission prejudiced the illegal-assembly count | Reversed on count one: admission improper and not harmless; NPLEx error prejudicial |
| 2. Expert testimony on intent (ultimate issue) | Kemp’s specialized methamphetamine knowledge aided the jury; testimony was permissible under Evid.R. 704 and 702 | Kemp impermissibly testified to the ultimate issue of intent beyond proper expert scope | Overruled: court found Kemp’s testimony admissible and within discretion (assignment denied) |
| 3. Denial of mid-trial self-representation (Faretta) | Request was untimely (made after trial started) and trial court did not abuse discretion in denying it | Denial violated Sixth Amendment; he had articulated cogent reasons and prior complaints about counsel | Denial affirmed: request was untimely (made after evidence presentation began) and court did not abuse discretion |
| 4. Manifest-weight challenge to illegal-assembly conviction | State: circumstantial evidence (purchases together, furtive conduct, meth found on defendant) supported intent | Struble: purchases were consistent with innocent uses; presence with others shouldn’t suffice; evidence insufficient | Mixed: court held jury didn’t lose its way on weight, but because conviction relied in part on improperly admitted NPLEx report, conviction for illegal assembly reversed and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Thompkins v. Ohio, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997) (standard for manifest-weight review)
- Vrabel v. Ohio, 99 Ohio St.3d 184 (2003) (untimely mid-trial Faretta requests may be denied)
- Bostic v. Connor, 37 Ohio St.3d 144 (1988) (trial court may exclude expert testimony on an ultimate issue if not necessary)
- State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366 (1976) (waiver of counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent)