State v. Strong, 499 P.3d 481

Police executed a search warrant at a Manhattan, Kansas house located within 1,000 feet of a school; Strong emerged from a bedroom during the search.
Officers found in the bedroom mail addressed to Strong, a digital scale, two baggies containing ~1.4 g and ~10.24 g methamphetamine (total >11 g), and many empty baggies.
Strong was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school (K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5705) and possession of drug paraphernalia.
The statute (K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2)) creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to distribute when a person possesses 3.5 grams or more of methamphetamine; the district court instructed the jury using a PIK-based, permissive-presumption instruction.
The jury convicted Strong on both counts and the court sentenced him to 186 months; Strong appealed, arguing (1) the statutory presumption is unconstitutional, (2) the jury instruction was legally improper, and (3) his sentence was unconstitutional for relying on prior convictions.

Issue	Strong's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Constitutionality of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5705(e) (presumption)	The statute creates a mandatory rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden and relieves the State of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt.	The statute creates a permissive (rebuttable) inference the jury may accept or reject; it does not shift the burden of persuasion.	Statute is facially constitutional; the presumption is permissive and justified by reason/common sense.
Jury Instruction No. 6 (describing presumption)	Instruction misstated the law by giving a permissive mandate rather than the statute's intended restriction.	Instruction tracked PIK, told jury they may accept or reject the presumption and reminded that burden never shifts to defendant.	Instruction was legally appropriate, fairly stated the law, and was not clearly erroneous.
Use of prior convictions to increase sentence	Using prior convictions to enhance sentence without jury proof violated Kansas Constitution §5 and the Sixth/Fourteenth Amendments.	Defendant did not preserve the argument; Supreme Court precedent upholds judicial factfinding for criminal history in sentencing.	Claims not considered on appeal (not preserved) and, in any event, precedent (Albano, Ivory, Sullivan) forecloses them.

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1985) (distinguishes mandatory presumptions from permissive inferences; due process limits on presumptions)
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (U.S. 1979) (permissive inference explained; constitutionality depends on whether inference is reasonable)
State v. Macomber, 309 Kan. 907 (Kan. 2019) (when presumption favors State, jury must be clearly instructed that burden does not shift)
State v. Haremza, 213 Kan. 201 (Kan. 1973) (statutory presumptions are ordinarily rebuttable and do not alter prosecution's ultimate burden)
State v. Butler, 307 Kan. 831 (Kan. 2018) (Supreme Court recommends use of PIK instructions)
State v. McDaniel, 306 Kan. 595 (Kan. 2017) (limits on applying invited error doctrine where party did not request challenged language)
State v. Albano, 313 Kan. 638 (Kan. 2021) (KSGA criminal-history findings by judge for sentencing do not violate Kansas Constitution §5)
State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44 (Kan. 2002) (using criminal history to increase sentence without jury finding does not violate Sixth Amendment)
State v. Sullivan, 307 Kan. 697 (Kan. 2018) (reaffirmed Ivory on sentencing and judicial factfinding)