State v. Strong, 356 P.3d 1078

Background

Strong was charged with four counts of violating an August 10, 2012 no-contact order obtained by his wife while he was jailed; he admitted making four recorded phone calls from jail to her on November 6, 2012.
Jessica later asked the court to dismiss the protection order two days after the calls; Strong had no court notice rescinding the order before calling.
The State charged two misdemeanor and two felony counts under § 45-5-626, MCA; Strong moved to dismiss all or, alternatively, to treat three counts as one under the “same transaction” rule (§ 46-11-410).
The District Court denied the motion, ruling each phone call violated the no-contact provision and could be charged separately; Strong pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors and one felony, reserving the dismissal issue for appeal.
The Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether the calls were part of a “same transaction” and whether an exception barred multiple convictions when the statute does not prohibit a continuing course of conduct.

Issues

Issue	Strong's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether multiple calls that stem from a single conversation constitute a single "same transaction" offense or may be charged separately	Calls were a single, ongoing conversation and thus one offense (or fall under the § 46-11-410(2)(e) exception)	Each call violated the discrete no-contact provision; prosecutor may charge each violation separately	The calls meet the statutory definition of "same transaction," but that does not preclude multiple charges because § 45-5-626 defines each violation as a discrete act;
Whether § 46-11-410(2)(e) bars multiple convictions when the offense is a continuing course of conduct	The order-violation is continuous like stalking; exception applies because calls formed a continuing interrupted course of conduct	§ 45-5-626 is not defined to prohibit a continuing course of conduct; each violation is complete when a provision is violated	Exception (2)(e) does not apply: violating an order is a discrete act per statutory language, so multiple counts are permissible
Whether sentencing/enhancement structure requires sequential convictions (stacking) rather than simultaneous charging	Charging simultaneous counts to reach felony enhancement contradicts the statutory scheme and legislative intent	Prosecutors may charge predicate counts simultaneously; enhanced penalties treat prior/subsequent offenses as sentencing factors	Simultaneous charging is allowed; statutes and precedent permit charging multiple counts that may produce stacking at sentencing
Whether prosecutorial discretion or double jeopardy principles constrain multiple counts here	Overcharging based on method (phone vs. in-person) is overzealous and conflicts with statutory intent	Charging decisions are within prosecutorial discretion; courts must respect that discretion	Prosecutor acted within broad discretion; no statutory or double jeopardy bar found by the majority

Key Cases Cited

State v. Zink, 374 Mont. 102, 319 P.3d 596 (review of motion to dismiss is de novo)
State v. Parks, 372 Mont. 88, 310 P.3d 1088 (series of related phone omissions constituted same transaction)
State v. Geren, 367 Mont. 437, 291 P.3d 1144 (distinct sexual acts—even same day—can be separate transactions)
State v. Williams, 355 Mont. 354, 228 P.3d 1127 (single attack producing related charges may be a single transaction)
State v. Goodenough, 358 Mont. 219, 245 P.3d 14 (same-transaction conduct can still yield multiple convictions absent exception)
State v. Tichenor, 313 Mont. 95, 60 P.3d 454 (simultaneous charging of stacking offenses permissible; prior "offense" can be a sentencing factor)
State v. Dasen, 337 Mont. 74, 155 P.3d 1282 (discussing stacking and sentencing framework)
Lindseth v. State, 203 Mont. 115, 659 P.2d 844 (noting double-jeopardy concerns with multiple counts)
Infinity Ins. Co. v. Dodson, 302 Mont. 209, 14 P.3d 487 (statutory interpretation: apply plain meaning)