State v. Street, 945 N.W.2d 450

Background

In February 2017, Chad K. Street crashed into a parked, unoccupied 2005 Chevy Equinox and fled the scene; the victim’s vehicle became inoperable and was towed to a body shop.
A body‑shop estimator produced a repair estimate of $10,347.70 to restore the vehicle to its pre‑accident condition; no evidence of the vehicle’s pre‑accident fair market value was introduced.
Street pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident and reckless driving; the State sought restitution under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29‑2280 to 29‑2289.
The county court ordered restitution equal to the repair cost ($10,347.70), orally specifying $300 per month until paid; the written order, however, only listed the total amount and omitted the payment schedule.
Street appealed on grounds that (1) the State failed to prove “actual damages” because it presented no market‑value evidence and (2) he lacked the ability to pay; lower courts affirmed. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the pronounced sentence but remanded to correct the written judgment to match the oral pronouncement.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Street)	Held
Whether repair cost may constitute “actual damages” for restitution absent evidence of pre‑loss market value	Repair cost is competent evidence of actual damages; statutes do not require proof of market value before ordering repair‑cost restitution	"Actual damages" for a vehicle must be tied to its pre‑accident fair market value (civil diminution‑in‑value principle); without market‑value evidence, restitution is unsupported	Repair cost may serve as actual damages when supported by evidence; court did not abuse discretion in ordering restitution equal to repair estimate
Whether § 29‑2282 requires replacement value when repair is “impractical” and whether a “totaled” notation mandates replacement‑value computation	§ 29‑2282 provides options (return, repair, or replacement) and the choice is discretionary; “totaled” alone does not compel replacement‑value restitution	A vehicle described as "totaled" shows repair is impractical, so restitution should be based on replacement (market) value	The sentencing court has discretion to determine which measure returns the victim to pre‑loss position; "totaled" label was not dispositive and repair estimate was a permissible basis
Whether the court abused its discretion by ordering restitution Street cannot afford	Court considered Street’s income, expenses, voluntary payments, and bond history and reasonably fixed $300/month	Street asserted indigency and that $300/month would reduce his income below poverty	Ability to pay is a factor to be balanced, not a prerequisite; the court reasonably exercised discretion in setting $300/month and amount of restitution
Whether failure of the written judgment to specify timing/installments of restitution is reversible error	The sentencing court must specify one of the options in § 29‑2281; the oral pronouncement satisfied that requirement and the written order should conform	The omission in the written order creates uncertainty and is error	Omission is plain error; the pronounced sentence controls and the written judgment must be modified to reflect the oral payment terms

Key Cases Cited

State v. McCulley, 305 Neb. 139, 939 N.W.2d 373 (Neb. 2020) (ability to pay is a consideration to be weighed, not a prerequisite to ordering restitution)
State v. Esch, 290 Neb. 88, 858 N.W.2d 219 (Neb. 2015) (plain error where a restitution sentence fails to specify timing or installments)
State v. McBride, 27 Neb. App. 219, 927 N.W.2d 842 (Neb. App. 2019) (restitution statutes do not expressly require consideration of depreciation or market value when calculating actual damages)
State v. Olbricht, 294 Neb. 974, 885 N.W.2d 699 (Neb. 2016) (a sentence pronounced from the bench controls over a later inconsistent written judgment)
State v. Sundling, 248 Neb. 732, 538 N.W.2d 749 (Neb. 1995) (penal statutes are to be strictly construed but given sensible meaning)