State v. Stowell, 466 P.3d 1009

Home-invasion burglary: victims returned to find passports, checks, documents, electronics, women’s clothing, and a truck key missing; the pickup later disappeared.
Forensic and circumstantial links: defendant’s fingerprint was lifted from a forced-open kitchen window; stolen passports/blank checks were later found in Brandy Littlepage’s car; the recovered truck contained clothing and was adjusted for a short driver.
Defendant admitted knowing Littlepage (meth supplier); denied knowledge of stolen items.
Indictment charged first-degree burglary (intent to commit theft and unlawful use of vehicle), unauthorized use of a vehicle, and first-degree theft ($1,000+). Prosecution argued two alternative theories: defendant acted alone (principal) or opened the window to facilitate Littlepage (aider/abettor).
Trial court gave standard aiding-and-abetting instructions but did not instruct the jury that jurors must unanimously agree on whether defendant was a principal or an aider/abettor; defendant also requested a jury instruction that the state must prove he was "negligently unaware" of the property’s $1,000+ value, which the court refused. Jury convicted on all counts.
On appeal, the state conceded plain error as to the missing jury-concurrence instruction but argued harmlessness; defendant also challenged the refusal of his proposed mens rea instruction for theft.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the jury must be instructed that jurors must concur on the theory of liability (principal vs aider/abettor)	State conceded omission was plain error but argued it was harmless because jurors necessarily found the same core facts (e.g., opening the window)	Trial court plainly erred by not requiring jury unanimity on theory; omission risked an impermissible "mix-and-match" verdict	Court: Plain error; omission was not harmless; appellate court exercised discretion to correct error — reversed and remanded
Whether the trial court erred in refusing defendant’s proposed instruction that the state must prove defendant was "negligently unaware" the stolen property’s value exceeded $1,000	State relied on prior precedent (Jones): theft statutes prescribe an "intent" mental state and the value element does not necessarily require a culpable mental state, so no lesser mens rea instruction is required	Defendant argued that, under Simonov and ORS 161.115(2), a lesser mental state (criminal negligence) should apply to the value element	Court: No error. Jones controls; ORS 161.115(1) applies here and the value element is not an element that "necessarily requires" a culpable mental state, so the requested "negligently unaware" instruction was properly refused

State v. Phillips, 354 Or. 598 (discusses need for jury concurrence when statute authorizes alternative means or theories)
State v. Miranda, 290 Or. App. 741 (plain-error framework for omitted jury-concurrence instruction)
State v. Jones, 223 Or. App. 611 (held theft statute’s value element does not necessarily require proving a culpable mental state)
State v. Simonov, 358 Or. 531 (analyzes which culpable mental state applies when a Criminal Code statute omits a mental-state specification)
State v. Ashkins, 357 Or. 642 (explains impermissible "mix-and-match" verdicts when jurors rely on different acts)
Mellerio v. Nooth, 279 Or. App. 419 (same principle on jury unanimity across differing acts)
State v. Pine, 336 Or. 194 (discusses causation concepts relevant to distinguishing direct and accomplice liability)
State v. Gaines, 275 Or. App. 736 (addresses harmlessness and appellate correction of plain error in liability-theory contexts)
State v. Blanton, 284 Or. 591 (comments on the circularity of the "necessarily requires a culpable mental state" language)
State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or. 486 (addresses distinguishing element types for mens rea analysis)
State v. Rutley, 343 Or. 368 (related mens rea/element-type analysis)