State v. Stover
102 N.E.3d 31
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In August 2016 Officer Jeffrey Lennons found Christina Stover asleep and reclined in a running vehicle in a Kroger parking lot; the vehicle had been reported occupied and running for ~2 hours.
- Officer observed Stover sweating, unresponsive to knocking for several minutes, then quickly sit up and open the door; the vehicle heater was running on a very hot day and the vehicle had passenger-side damage.
- The police chief arrived and instructed Lennons to administer standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs); Lennons testified he had concerns she might be under the influence or experiencing a medical condition but also said he did not have a suspicion before the tests.
- Stover refused to perform SFSTs without her attorney present; Lennons told her she could speak to a lawyer later and administered the SFSTs after instructing her; she performed poorly, was arrested, and officers later found methamphetamine and Hydrocodone in the vehicle. Urine tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana.
- Stover moved to suppress arguing (1) the stop/detention for SFSTs lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion and (2) her statutory/right-to-counsel under R.C. 2935.20 was violated when she was not allowed counsel during SFSTs. The trial court granted suppression; the state appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Stover to conduct SFSTs | The totality of circumstances (long-occupied running vehicle, unresponsiveness, sweating, heater on, vehicle damage) gave objective reasonable suspicion to investigate impairment | Officer lacked reasonable suspicion; initial contact was medical/innocent and detention for SFSTs was unlawful | Reversed: objective facts gave reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain for SFSTs |
| Whether refusal to allow counsel during SFSTs violated R.C. 2935.20 or the right to counsel requiring suppression | State: R.C. 2935.20 (and Sixth Amendment) does not require counsel at noncustodial SFSTs and statutory violation does not warrant exclusion of evidence | Stover: statute and right-to-counsel entitle her to consult counsel before SFSTs; denial required suppression | Reversed: SFSTs are not a “critical stage”; exclusionary rule not appropriate remedy for R.C. 2935.20 violation; suppression not required |
Key Cases Cited
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (probable-cause traffic stops valid despite subjective officer motivation)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes reasonable, articulable suspicion standard for investigative stops)
- State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 (2007) (totality-of-circumstances test for reasonable suspicion)
- State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177 (1988) (discusses objective basis for investigative detentions)
- State v. Griffith, 74 Ohio St.3d 554 (1996) (exclusionary rule not a remedy for violation of R.C. 2935.20 in OVI context)
- McNulty v. Curry, 42 Ohio St.2d 341 (1975) (field sobriety tests are not a critical stage implicating Sixth Amendment counsel right)