State v. Stockert, 464 P.3d 151

Early morning ODF&W decoy sting near Tillamook: troopers placed a decoy deer beside Highway 6 before sunrise to detect unlawful shooting.
Defendant stopped ~80 feet from the decoy about 6:15 a.m., pointed headlights at it, and fired a .30-06 rifle; sunrise was 7:15 a.m. (hunting within 30 minutes of sunrise prohibited by rule).
Troopers identified themselves; defendant admitted he thought it might be a "dummy" but also that he shot believing it could be a deer and that he intended to hunt.
Charges included hunting with an artificial light (ORS 498.142) and hunting deer during prohibited hours (ORS 496.992); motor-vehicle hunting count was dismissed; jury convicted on the remaining counts.
Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal arguing the state failed to prove an attempt to "take wildlife" because the object shot was a decoy; the state argued shooting a decoy believing it to be an animal satisfies an attempt to take wildlife.
The trial court denied the acquittal motion; the court of appeals affirmed, interpreting "hunt"/"attempt" in the wildlife statutes to include shooting at a decoy believed to be an animal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether shooting at a decoy believed to be an animal constitutes an "attempt to take" wildlife (and thus "hunt")	Shooting at what the actor believes is wildlife is an attempted taking; "attempt" should be read in its ordinary sense as part of the statutory definition of "hunt"	Because no live animal existed, the state failed to prove an attempt to take wildlife; the decoy statute shows the legislature intended a separate offense for decoy conduct	Court held that "hunt" includes acts intended to kill/capture wildlife; firing at a decoy believed to be a deer is an attempt to take wildlife and satisfies the statutory definition of hunting
Whether "attempt" in the wildlife definition incorporates the criminal-code inchoate-attempt doctrine (and related defenses like impossibility)	The state argued context allows using inchoate attempt doctrine (and impossibility is no defense) but the broader statutory context supports ordinary meaning	Defendant argued historical statutory meaning required proof the actor would have completed the taking but for interruption; argued reading "attempt" to include impossibility eliminates need for the decoy statute	Court rejected importing the criminal-code definition; interpreted "attempt" in ORS 496.004(10) in its ordinary, process-oriented sense (efforts to kill/capture whether successful or not); legislative history of the decoy statute does not displace the ordinary reading

PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993) (statutory interpretation framework applied)
State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009) (modification of PGE interpretive approach)
State v. Boyd, 92 Or. App. 51, 756 P.2d 1276 (1988) (discussion of using criminal-code definitions for statutes outside criminal code)
Messick v. Duby, 86 Or. 366, 168 P. 628 (1917) (rule against implied repeal; coexistence of overlapping statutes)
State v. Ofodrinwa, 353 Or. 507, 300 P.3d 154 (2013) (legislature may enact duplicative statutes)
State v. Merrill, 303 Or. App. 107, 463 P.3d 540 (2020) (recognition that overlapping statutes can stand)
United States v. Havis, 929 F.3d 317 (6th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing ordinary use of "attempt" from criminal inchoate attempt)