430 P.3d 1059
Or.2018Background
- Police stopped a van for a broken headlight; officer obtained driver ID and ran a records check.
- Officer reapproached the van, questioned passengers; one passenger (Shaw) gave inconsistent name spellings; defendant (a passenger) said she was on parole and vouched that Shaw was "Jonathan Shaw."
- Records check showed the DOT photo for Jonathan Shaw did not match the passenger; officer repeatedly questioned Shaw and defendant about Shaw’s identity and warned defendant she could be in trouble with her parole officer if she were lying.
- Officer called defendant’s parole officer, who reported previously finding pills in a backpack with Shaw and thought defendant might be using drugs again.
- Defendant stepped out of the van with a backpack; the officer asked to search the backpack, she consented, and the search revealed methamphetamine. Defendant was arrested and convicted; she moved to suppress, arguing she had been unlawfully seized before she consented.
- Trial court denied suppression; Court of Appeals upheld that defendant was not seized until after consent, relying on State v. Amaya. The Oregon Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Stevens) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Amaya’s statement that stopping a driver is not a seizure of passengers is part of its holding and should be followed | Amaya is binding; passengers are not automatically seized when a vehicle is stopped | Amaya (and Thompkin) were dicta or wrongly decided and should be overruled in light of Brendlin | Court held Amaya’s rule was part of its holding and adhered to it; decline to overrule |
| Whether defendant was seized before she consented to the backpack search | Any coercion ended before consent; questions were routine and she consented voluntarily | Officer’s repeated, accusatory questioning and warning about parole officer communicated that she was not free to leave, making it a seizure | Court held defendant was seized before consent when officer warned about parole trouble; seizure lacked reasonable suspicion |
| Whether consent to search was voluntary and attenuated from any prior unlawful seizure | Consent followed a break in seizure or was voluntary and not fruit of unlawful stop | Consent flowed directly from coercive interaction and concurrent search of Shaw’s belongings, so it was tainted | Court held consent was not meaningfully attenuated and was product of unlawful seizure; suppression required |
| Remedy: appellate and trial-court outcomes | Uphold conviction and denial of suppression | Reverse conviction and suppress evidence obtained from tainted consent | Court reversed Court of Appeals and circuit-court judgment and remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Amaya, 336 Or. 616, 89 P.3d 1163 (Or. 2004) (stated stopping a driver does not automatically seize passengers under Ore. Const. art. I, § 9)
- State v. Thompkin, 341 Or. 368, 143 P.3d 530 (Or. 2006) (applied Amaya and held passenger was later seized without reasonable suspicion)
- Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (U.S. 2007) (federal rule treating passengers as seized when vehicle is stopped for officer-safety reasons)
- State v. Backstrand, 354 Or. 392, 313 P.3d 1084 (Or. 2013) (framework for when officer questions and actions constitute a seizure)
- State v. Unger, 356 Or. 59, 333 P.3d 1009 (Or. 2014) (state must show consent was voluntary and not product of police exploitation of illegal stop)