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254 A.3d 217
Vt.
2021
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Background

  • Late on Oct. 8, 2016 defendant drove the wrong way on I-89 at high speed, struck a car carrying five teenagers (all killed), fled in a police cruiser, returned the wrong way, and struck the wreckage again.
  • Charged with five counts of second-degree murder, grossly negligent operation, and operating a vehicle without owner consent; defendant asserted insanity and diminished-capacity defenses.
  • Thirteen-day jury trial with extensive expert testimony: two defense forensic psychiatrists opined legal insanity; State’s expert countered and concluded no qualifying mental disease.
  • Jury rejected insanity defense and convicted on all counts; defendant sentenced to lengthy concurrent terms; defendant renewed motion for judgment of acquittal as to murder intent and appealed.
  • On appeal defendant raised four principal claims: (1) insufficiency of evidence of wanton intent for second-degree murder; (2) court should have instructed jury that State expert’s sanity opinion was irrelevant to diminished-capacity; (3) discovery/due-process violation from State expert’s unexpected rebuttal opinion about defense diagnosis; and (4) trial court erred in denying mistrial after disclosure failures regarding a defense witness’s pretrial statements.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Sufficiency of intent for 2d-degree murder (wanton disregard) Circumstantial evidence (wrong-way driving at high speed, passing other cars, horn/flash warnings, late steering into travel lane) permits inference defendant was subjectively aware of a high risk of death and wantonly disregarded it. Defendant contends evidence does not show subjective awareness of deadly risk; delusional thinking (agreed to by experts to some extent) negates wanton intent. Affirmed. Evidence sufficient to permit jury to infer subjective awareness and wanton disregard; insanity/delusion evidence did not preclude the jury from finding mens rea.
Jury instruction on relevance of State expert’s sanity opinion to diminished-capacity State: expert sanity testimony was relevant because defendant pleaded insanity and there is overlap between insanity and mental-state elements of crimes. Defendant: court should have instructed jury that State expert’s sanity opinion was irrelevant to diminished-capacity. No plain error. Court and parties distinguished insanity from mens rea; expert sanity testimony was relevant and not erroneously used to negate diminished-capacity.
Admission of State expert’s rebuttal opinion about whether borderline/unspecified personality disorder qualifies as a "mental disease" (discovery/due process) State: testimony was within disclosed expert issues and rebuttal scope; any inconsistency could be exposed on cross-examination and defense could recall its expert. Defendant: proffer was a late/unexpected opinion, preventing defense experts from responding and creating asymmetrical discovery and prejudice. No reversible error. Trial court acted within discretion; any disclosure problem did not cause meaningful prejudice—defense cross-examined expert and did not seek continuance or recall its expert.
Motion for mistrial based on undisclosed prosecutor-witness pretrial conversations (witness said defendant later told her there were no wrong-way signs) State: produced at least one recording to defense-related expert; dispute about whether disclosure reached defense; prosecutor believed she had disclosed. Defendant: prosecution failed to disclose witness’s pretrial statements, which undermined insanity defense and his ability to investigate; mistrial required. Denied. Court assumed possible disclosure lapse but found no bad faith and cured potential prejudice with an immediate, agreed curative instruction and access to recorded jail calls; jury presumed to follow instruction.

Key Cases Cited

  • State v. Baird, 175 A.3d 493 (2017) (defines wantonness as extreme recklessness disregarding probable loss of life)
  • State v. Brunell, 615 A.2d 127 (Vt. 1992) (subjective awareness of deadly risk required for wantonness)
  • State v. Sidway, 431 A.2d 1237 (Vt. 1981) (circumstantial proof can raise inference of knowledge)
  • State v. Messier, 497 A.2d 740 (Vt. 1985) (overlap between insanity evidence and mens rea; mental disease evidence may affect intent inquiry)
  • State v. Webster, 179 A.3d 149 (2017) (distinguishing when State’s sanity evidence is irrelevant because sanity was not contested)
  • State v. Miller, 502 A.2d 832 (Vt. 1985) (trial court discretion in admitting late-disclosed inculpatory testimony subject to cross-examination/recall)
  • State v. Provost, 896 A.2d 55 (Vt. 2005) (defendant must show both discovery rule violation and resulting prejudice)
  • State v. Sarkisian-Kennedy, 227 A.3d 1007 (2020) (limits on presuming jury will follow curative instruction; presumption applies absent overwhelming probability instruction is ineffective)
  • Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) (discusses when curative instructions are insufficient to cure prejudice)
  • Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (reciprocal discovery requirements and due-process limits on asymmetrical disclosure)
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Case Details

Case Name: State v. Steven D. Bourgoin
Court Name: Supreme Court of Vermont
Date Published: Mar 12, 2021
Citations: 254 A.3d 217; 2021 VT 15; 2019-319
Docket Number: 2019-319
Court Abbreviation: Vt.
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    State v. Steven D. Bourgoin, 254 A.3d 217