State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65

Background

Defendant was charged with multiple burglaries and sexual assaults against four women (2002–2005); trials were conducted in two phases (first trial: K.G., L.R., and S.P.; second trial: J.L.).
State’s theory: crimes reflected a common perpetrator; DNA obtained after defendant’s arrest in the S.P. burglary linked him to sexual assaults. Defense sought severance; trial court joined K.G. and L.R. as signature crimes and allowed S.P. burglary to be tried with them.
Jury convicted on all counts in both trials; aggregate sentence imposed. Appellate Division reversed all convictions except a separate certain‑persons weapons conviction, finding joinder and other‑crimes rulings erroneous. State appealed.
Supreme Court held joinder of K.G. and L.R. was improper (not signature crimes) and admission of S.P. burglary evidence in J.L. trial was erroneous; but on harmless‑error review affirmed convictions as to L.R. (robust nuclear DNA + strong ID) and S.P. burglary (overwhelming eyewitness/show‑up evidence). Convictions for K.G. and J.L. reversed and remanded.
Key legal focus: limits on joinder, N.J.R.E. 404(b) other‑crimes evidence, the “signature crime” standard from Fortin, and harmless‑error review conviction‑by‑conviction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether assaults on K.G. and L.R. could be joined as signature crimes	Similarities (condom use, racial comments, cutting underwear) show distinctive modus operandi justifying joinder	Crimes are not sufficiently unique or nearly identical; severance required	Joinder as signature crimes was improper — similarities not distinctive enough under Fortin
Whether S.P. burglary could be joined with sexual assaults / admitted to explain DNA recovery	S.P. burglary explains how police obtained defendant’s DNA and led to discovery of gun; probative on identity	Burglary unrelated to sexual assaults; admission was prejudicial and unnecessary	Trial court erred admitting extensive S.P. burglary evidence with sexual‑assault trials; admission prejudicial (but S.P. burglary conviction itself was harmless error and affirmed)
Whether other‑crimes evidence (S.P.) in J.L. trial was admissible	Needed to explain how defendant was linked to evidence; admissible for limited purpose	Irrelevant to contested issues in J.L.; served impermissible propensity inference	Admission was improper and prejudicial; convictions for J.L. reversed and remanded
Whether errors were harmless and which convictions must stand	DNA and identification evidence make joinder/404(b) errors harmless for some counts	Prejudice from joinder and improper evidence undermined fair trial for several counts	Harmless‑error applied conviction‑by‑conviction: L.R. (affirmed) and S.P. (affirmed) because of overwhelming independent proof; K.G. and J.L. convictions reversed and remanded

Key Cases Cited

State v. Chenique‑Puey, 145 N.J. 334 (1996) (joinder favored but cannot prejudice defendant; analyze severance under Rule 3:15‑2)
State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992) (N.J.R.E. 404(b) analysis and requirements for other‑crimes evidence)
State v. Fortin, 162 N.J. 517 (2000) (signature‑crime doctrine; heightened standard for modus operandi evidence)
State v. Fortin, 189 N.J. 579 (2007) (Fortin III) (expert testimony may be required when signature features are not within common juror understanding)
State v. Oliver, 133 N.J. 141 (1993) (limits on joining discrete similar assaults absent integrated plan)
State v. Gillispie, 208 N.J. 59 (2011) (admission of other‑crimes evidence when weapon uniquely connects offenses)
State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293 (2006) (harmless‑error standard under federal and state constitutional analysis)
State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311 (2011) (harmless‑error review and standard)