State v. Stephenson, 389 P.3d 272

Two-year-old Isaiah was put to bed by his mother, Jennifer Stephenson, in a locked bedroom; next morning he was found pinned between a dresser and a bed crossbar and suffered compartment syndrome requiring fasciotomies and permanent scarring.
Medical testimony established compartment syndrome in children takes many hours to develop; experts estimated Isaiah had been trapped roughly 6–24 hours (commonly 8–12 hours).
The State prosecuted Stephenson for negligently causing or negligently permitting child abuse (Section 30-6-1(D)); at trial the State abandoned the causing theory and pursued permitting; the court also instructed the jury on abandonment (Section 30-6-1(B)) as a lesser step-down offense.
The jury acquitted or had reasonable doubt on permitting child abuse but convicted Stephenson of abandonment resulting in great bodily harm; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding abandonment required intent to never return.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the proper scope of “leaving or abandoning” in Section 30-6-1(B) and whether evidence supported conviction; it holds that "leaving" and "abandoning" are distinct theories but reverses the conviction for insufficient evidence that Stephenson left Isaiah under circumstances exposing him to risk of harm.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Stephenson)	Held
Proper scope of “leaving or abandoning” under §30-6-1(B)	"Abandoning" requires intent to not return; but statute also covers temporary custodians so both words should reach culpable desertion or departure that risks neglect	Argues ambiguity; emphasizes common-sense reading that criminal liability should not extend to routine acts like putting a child to bed	Court: "leaving" and "abandoning" are distinct; "abandoning" may imply intent not to return; "leaving" covers intentional departure or causing child to remain in a condition that risks neglect where well-being is at risk
Whether evidence supported conviction for abandonment (intentionally left child under circumstances risking neglect)	Inference that Isaiah would have screamed for many hours and Stephenson was not present or ignored him; reasonable for jury to find she left him in peril	Evidence is speculative; parents exchanged texts, both slept in the apartment, no proof Stephenson left or knew Isaiah was in peril; conviction would criminalize ordinary parenting	Court: Evidence insufficient — State failed to prove Stephenson intentionally left Isaiah under circumstances where his well-being was at risk; reverse and enter judgment of acquittal

State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 908 P.2d 1379 (N.M. 1995) (legislative intent governs statutory construction)
State v. Tafoya, 285 P.3d 604 (N.M. 2012) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
State v. Chávez, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891 (N.M. 2009) (criminal statutes must be strictly construed)
State v. Bybee, 109 N.M. 44, 781 P.2d 316 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (may not apply statute beyond intended scope)
State v. Rivera, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (N.M. 2004) (avoid construing provisions to render others superfluous)
State v. Lujan, 103 N.M. 667, 712 P.2d 13 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (purpose of §30-6-1 is child protection)
State v. Slade, 331 P.3d 930 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (speculation among equally plausible alternatives is not substantial evidence)
State v. Graham, 137 N.M. 197, 109 P.3d 285 (N.M. 2005) (Legislature did not intend to criminalize conduct creating only a mere possibility of harm)