State v. Stephen William Lundquist
Background
- Victim ended relationship with Lundquist in Sept. 2013; civil protection and no-contact orders issued in Oct. 2013.
- Between Oct. 2013 and Jan. 2014, victim testified Lundquist repeatedly contacted her by phone, texts, email, and letter, and appeared at locations where she was present despite the orders.
- Specific acts included a ~10-minute call after the victim told him not to call, repeated calls from blocked/unidentified numbers, emails/letters referencing religion, and multiple sightings at restaurants/stores.
- Victim altered her behavior and security (changed locks, deactivated garage code, adopted a dog, used pepper spray, avoided places) and testified to feeling "creeped out," harassed, alarmed, and emotionally distressed.
- Lundquist was charged with multiple counts of first-degree stalking (I.C. §§ 18-7905, 18-7906); jury convicted on the January 2014 count, acquitted on a later charge; sentence suspended and probation imposed; Lundquist appealed for insufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence showed Lundquist acted knowingly or maliciously | State: repeated contacts after orders show notice and malicious intent | Lundquist: no evidence he intended to annoy/harass or commit a wrongful act | Affirmed — sufficient evidence of malice (intent to vex/commit wrongful act) and knowing conduct |
| Whether contacts constituted a "course of conduct" (repeated nonconsensual contacts) | State: multiple calls, texts, emails, and appearances satisfy statutory definition | Lundquist: some contacts were consensual or coincidental (places both frequented) | Affirmed — sufficient evidence of repeated nonconsensual contacts |
| Whether conduct "seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed" the victim | State: victim testified to alarm, harassment, and behavioral changes | Lundquist: no threats, no expressed fear, some reactions subjective | Affirmed — victim testimony sufficient to establish serious annoyance/alarm/harassment |
| Whether a reasonable person would have suffered substantial emotional distress | State: cumulative unwanted contacts after orders would cause substantial distress | Lundquist: isolated items (e.g., religious letter) not objectively distressing | Affirmed — jury reasonably could find the conduct would cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 957 P.2d 1099 (Ct. App. 1998) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
- State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991) (deference to jury on witness credibility and inferences)
- State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 701 P.2d 303 (Ct. App. 1985) (same)
- State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) (issue-waiver where appellant fails to brief authority or argument)
- VanHorn v. State, 889 N.E.2d 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (distinguished — lack of protective order meant no notice of impermissibility)