State v. Stephen F. Scharf(074922), 139 A.3d 1154

Background

In 1992 Jody Scharf died after falling from the Palisades cliffs; defendant Stephen Scharf claimed the death was an accident. Prosecutors later reinvestigated and indicted him for first‑degree murder; trial occurred in 2011.
The State sought to admit out‑of‑court statements by the decedent to friends and her therapist expressing fear of defendant and refusal to go to the cliffs, offered under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3) (state‑of‑mind) and 803(c)(4) (medical statements).
The trial court admitted limited state‑of‑mind testimony (five witnesses testified) and therapy statements; limiting instructions were prepared but a contemporaneous limiting instruction was not requested by defense.
The jury convicted Scharf of purposeful and knowing murder; the Appellate Division reversed, holding the hearsay was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to decide whether a decedent’s pre‑death statements of fear are admissible to rebut an accidental‑death defense and whether admission was an abuse of discretion in this case.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Scharf's Argument	Held
Admissibility of decedent’s statements of fear when defendant claims accident	Statements admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3) to prove decedent’s state of mind and rebut accidental‑death defense	Decedent’s fear is not probative of whether death was intentional; hearsay should be excluded as unfairly prejudicial	Admissible: when defendant opens the door by claiming accident, state‑of‑mind hearsay about fear is relevant and allowed under Rule 803(c)(3)
Scope/limits of permissible state‑of‑mind testimony	Testimony may be limited to fear, intent to continue divorce, and related state‑of‑mind matters; not to prove defendant’s conduct or motive	Admission invites juror inference of defendant’s guilt and is unduly prejudicial	Trial court may admit limited testimony (fear, general abuse, intent) but not to prove defendant’s actions; must assess relevance first, then Rule 403 balancing
Cumulative/prejudicial nature of multiple witnesses repeating fear statements	Only a few witnesses testified; testimony covered different facets and was brief overall	Multiple witnesses rendered testimony cumulative and highly prejudicial	No abuse of discretion: court correctly allowed limited number; fourth/fifth witnesses were brief and not erroneously cumulative
Adequacy of limiting instruction and timing	The parties negotiated instruction; jury was told to use statements only to determine decedent’s state of mind	Instruction was insufficient and should have been given contemporaneously and more thoroughly to prevent misuse	Instruction acceptable here (defense requested the language), but better practice: tailored limiting instructions at time of evidence and in final charge; courts must perform Rule 403 weighing and consider redaction/sanitization

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (recognizing state‑of‑mind statements can rebut claims of self‑defense, suicide, or accidental death)
State v. Benedetto, 120 N.J. 250 (1990) (state‑of‑mind exception is limited and must be relevant to issues at trial)
State v. McLaughlin, 205 N.J. 185 (2011) (state‑of‑mind hearsay admissibility requires logical connection to issues)
State v. Machado, 111 N.J. 480 (1988) (decedent’s declarations of fear admissible to show decedent was not aggressor or not suicide/accident if relevant)
State v. Calleia, 206 N.J. 274 (2011) (state‑of‑mind hearsay may not be used to prove defendant’s motive or conduct; use limited to assessing decedent’s likely actions)
State v. Aesoph, 647 N.W.2d 743 (S.D. 2002) (victim’s fear statements admissible to rebut accidental‑death defense)