State v. Stenson, 190 N.E.3d 1240

Darius Stenson was convicted (Mar. 20, 2020) of discharging a firearm on prohibited premises and aggravated assault and received an indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law (minimum 4, maximum 6 years) plus related specifications and concurrent terms.
On appeal he raised three assignments: (1) Reagan Tokes violates separation of powers; (2) it violates due process by creating an indefinite sentence; and (3) his sentence was excessive.
The Sixth District initially affirmed but dismissed the constitutional challenges as not ripe; the Ohio Supreme Court later held such challenges ripe (reversing Maddox) and remanded Stenson for consideration on the merits.
Reagan Tokes (S.B. 201, effective Mar. 22, 2019): judges set a minimum term (from R.C. 2929.14 range) and a statutory maximum (R.C. 2929.144); ODRC may, after a hearing, rebut the presumption of release at the minimum and maintain confinement for a reasonable additional period not exceeding the court-imposed maximum.
On remand the Sixth District addressed separation-of-powers and due-process claims; it rejected both facial constitutional challenges and affirmed the trial-court judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Separation of powers: Does Reagan Tokes impermissibly transfer judicial sentencing power to ODRC?	State: Trial court still sets minimum and maximum; ODRC only administers release within court-imposed range (analogous to parole/postrelease control).	Stenson: ODRC hearing can extend confinement beyond the court’s minimum, effectively increasing the sentence and usurping judicial power.	Court: No violation—trial court imposes min and max; ODRC may only maintain incarceration up to the judicially-imposed maximum; analogized to parole/postrelease-control systems upheld in Woods.
Due process: Does the presumption of release at the minimum create a liberty interest requiring Morrissey-level protections, and does the statute fail on its face?	State: Presumption is akin to parole-release decisions; statute provides for an ODRC hearing and minimal process suffices.	Stenson: Presumptive release creates a liberty interest; ODRC may extend confinement without statutorily specified procedural safeguards (notice, confrontation, etc.).	Court: The statute creates a liberty interest, and Morrissey-type protections are relevant because determinations are partly retrospective; but Stenson’s challenge is facial and fails—the law is not unconstitutional in all applications and as-applied procedural defects can be litigated later.

Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000) (upheld postrelease-control scheme and declined to find a separation-of-powers violation)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole-revocation due-process requirements)
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (due process for parole-release decisions is limited; disclosure and opportunity to be heard are required)
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (state-created good-time credits can create a liberty interest entitling inmates to due process)
McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 203 N.E.2d 334 (1964) (parole and final release are administrative functions)
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (facial-challenge standard: challenger must show no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid)
Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 844 N.E.2d 301 (2006) (reaffirms that judicial imposition of postrelease control avoids separation-of-powers issues)