State v. Stark
2011 SD 46
| S.D. | 2011Background
- Stark, a registered sex offender, was charged in Minnehaha County with two counts of loitering in a community safety zone after being observed near schools in Sioux Falls on April 22–23, 2009.
- South Dakota law prohibits sex offenders from loitering within 500 feet of a school, public park, public playground, or public pool (SDCL 22-24B-24; 22-24B-22).
- Officers followed Stark, observed him circling Whittier Park for about 20 minutes, and later stopped his van near Meldrum Park where an open bottle of vodka was found; Stark faced two loitering counts plus a DUI and open-container charge (the latter later dismissed).
- Stark argued the loitering statutes were unconstitutional and that there was insufficient evidence that his primary purpose was to observe or contact minors; the trial court denied motions for acquittal; a jury convicted Stark on the two loitering counts and the open-container charge.
- On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed on all issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of loitering statutes | Stark contends SDCL 22-24B-24 is unconstitutional as applied. | Stark argues the statute violates due process and is overbroad/vague. | Not unconstitutional as applied; statutes provide notice and limit enforcement to loitering for observing or contacting minors. |
| Amendment of Part II Information | Stark objected to amending the location of his prior felony conviction. | Amendment was improper or prejudicial. | Trial court did not err; amendment allowed under SDCL 23A-6-19, no prejudice shown. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for primary purpose | State did not prove Stark's primary purpose was to observe or contact minors beyond a reasonable doubt. | Jury credibility issues preclude finding intent beyond reasonable doubt. | Sufficient evidence supports that Stark's primary purpose was to observe or contact minors. |
| Admission of res gestae/other acts evidence | Evidence of a white van seen earlier was propensity evidence to show guilt. | Evidence was improper 404(b) risk. | Admission proper under res gestae; relevant context without improper purpose; no abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Stuck, 434 N.W.2d 43 (S.D. 1988) (amendment of information during trial allowed; substantial rights not prejudiced)
- Morales v. City of Chicago, 527 U.S. 41 (U.S. 1999) (loitering ordinance invalidated for vague/enforcement concerns (Morales discussed))
- State v. Asmussen, 2003 S.D. 102, 668 N.W.2d 725 (S.D. 2003) (vagueness analysis and due process considerations)
- State v. Martin, 2003 S.D. 153, 674 N.W.2d 291 (S.D. 2003) (de novo review of constitutionality with strong presumption of validity)
- State v. Goodroad, 1997 S.D. 46, 563 N.W.2d 126 (S.D. 1997) (res gestae and admission of contextual evidence)
- State v. McGill, 536 N.W.2d 89 (S.D. 1995) (vagueness standard for criminal statutes)
- Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (U.S. 1926) (constitutional vagueness analysis; definite standards)