State v. Stanislaw, 2011 ME 67

Stanislaw pleaded guilty to three Class B unlawful sexual contact charges, one Class C unlawful sexual contact, one Class D unlawful sexual touching, and four Class D assault charges for acts involving five girls aged ten to fourteen from 2002–2008.
The State dismissed other counts as part of the plea agreement, in exchange for Stanislaw's open guilty pleas to the remaining nine counts.
At sentencing (Jan. 27, 2010) the court imposed nine-year consecutive terms for each Class B offense, three years consecutive to those for Class C, and concurrent sentences for the assault and unlawful touching counts, totaling 28 years in prison plus four years of probation.
Stanislaw appealed asserting (a) misapplication of the Hewey three-step sentencing framework, (b) improper consecutivity under 17-A M.R.S. § 1256, and (c) that the overall sentence was excessive.
The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the felony sentences for failure to perform the first step of the Hewey analysis and remanded for proper resentencing, noting the analysis for consecutive sentences must be conducted when a primary sentence is set to run consecutively.
The court clarified that the first-step analysis focuses on the nature and seriousness of the offense, while aggravating factors are addressed in the second step; articulation of the sentencing process is required for meaningful appellate review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the basic term of imprisonment properly set under Hewey §1252-C(1)?	Stanislaw argues the court failed to consider all alternatives and misapplied the first step.	State contends the court appropriately exercised discretion within statutory limits.	No; the basic term was not properly determined and must be redone.
Must the court conduct a separate Hewey analysis for each consecutive primary sentence?	Stanislaw contends the consecutive structure requires separate first-step analysis for each primary sentence.	State contends the sentencing framework allows consideration within the overall structure.	Yes; remand required to perform separate first-step analyses for each consecutive sentence.
Did the court properly explain the process and factors at issue for appellate review?	Stanislaw argues the court did not articulate the first-step objective considerations.	State argues the court’s reasoning fell within discretionary judgment.	Not adequately demonstrated; requires remand with proper articulation.

State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151 (Me. 1993) (establishes three-step Hewey sentencing framework)
State v. Sweet, 745 A.2d 368 (Me. 2000) (guides core first-step considerations and uniformity)
State v. Dwyer, 985 A.2d 469 (Me. 2009) (de novo review of basic term of imprisonment)
State v. Pfeil, 720 A.2d 573 (Me. 1998) (principles for serious but non-violent components of offenses)
State v. Prewara, 687 A.2d 951 (Me. 1996) (context for sentencing framework in Maine)
State v. Downs, 962 A.2d 950 (Me. 2009) (abuse of discretion standard for overall sentence)
State v. Shulikov, 712 A.2d 504 (Me. 1998) (focus on objective facts in first-step analysis)
State v. Hutchinson, 969 A.2d 923 (Me. 2009) (whether the basic sentence warranted near maximum within Hewey framework)
State v. Ardolino, 697 A.2d 73 (Me. 1997) (consideration of defendant’s conduct against similar offenses)