State v. Stanford
1511011810
| Del. Super. Ct. | Jun 7, 2017Background
- Stanford pleaded guilty on December 12, 2016 to Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (PFBPP) and misdemeanor Endangering the Welfare of a Child and received a Level V sentence (15 years, suspended after 5 years to Level III) with mandatory minimum under 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)(b).
- He filed his first Rule 61 postconviction motion on January 18, 2017 (amended April 6, 2017), raising four grounds: (1) lack of probable cause for the residence search; (2) improper protective sweep; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel (counsel withheld apartment photos and failed to raise client concerns); and (4) an unfulfilled plea agreement regarding felony classification.
- The suppression motion attacking the protective sweep had been litigated and denied at a December 2, 2016 suppression hearing; Stanford did not appeal that ruling.
- The court treated the Rule 61 procedural bars (timeliness, repetitiveness, procedural default, former adjudication) claim-by-claim and found claims 1, 2, and 4 procedurally barred under Rule 61(i).
- The court expanded the record under Rule 61(g), obtained counsel’s affidavit describing plea negotiations and receipt of photos from the girlfriend, and allowed Stanford to respond.
- The court applied Strickland and related precedent: it summarily dismissed the ineffective-assistance claim (claim 3) under Rule 61(d)(5) for lack of particularized prejudice and denied appointment of counsel under Rule 61(e)(2).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Stanford) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Validity of search/probable cause | Suppression already litigated and denied; no basis to relitigate | Protective sweep/search unconstitutional; no probable cause | Procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) and (i)(4); not reviewed on merits |
| 2. Protective sweep constitutionality | Same as Issue 1: already litigated and denied | Officers lacked specific facts to believe occupants were armed/dangerous | Procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) and (i)(4); not reviewed on merits |
| 3. Ineffective assistance of counsel | Counsel reasonably pursued suppression and plea; photos came from girlfriend and were intended for trial | Counsel withheld apartment photos and failed to raise client concerns; ineffective assistance at plea stage | Summarily dismissed under Rule 61(d)(5): petitioner failed to plead particularized prejudice (no showing he would have gone to trial) |
| 4. Claim that plea was unfulfilled (felony class) | Previously adjudicated in prior Rule 35(b) motion | Plea should have been Class D, not Class C violent felony | Procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4); not reviewed on merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-part ineffective-assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (ineffective-assistance prejudice standard for challenges to guilty pleas)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (ineffective-assistance in the plea negotiation context)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133 (defense counsel's role in plea negotiations; Strickland framework applies)
- Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988) (applying Hill/Strickland principles to guilty-plea prejudice analysis)
- Sykes v. State, 147 A.3d 201 (Del. 2015) (discussing Rule 61 former adjudication procedural bar)
- Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724 (Del. 2014) (ineffective-assistance claims in postconviction proceedings; pleading particularity and prejudice)