State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124

Background

Aaron Stahl was charged with video voyeurism after store surveillance and a victim said she saw a man (identified as Stahl) holding an illuminated device under her skirt; police arrested him and later recovered an Apple iPhone 5 from his residence.
Stahl initially consented to a phone search during interview, then withdrew consent; a warrant was subsequently obtained to search the described iPhone 5.
The phone was passcode‑protected; Stahl refused to provide the passcode, preventing execution of the warrant.
The State moved to compel production of the passcode (offering immunity for providing it); the trial court denied the motion, finding the act testimonial and that the State had not met the foregone‑conclusion standard.
The State sought appellate review by certiorari; this court granted the petition, concluding the trial court departed from established law and quashed the order.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether compelling Stahl to provide his phone passcode implicates the Fifth Amendment testimonial privilege	Providing the passcode is not testimonial because the State already had a warrant and independent evidence; the request fits the act‑of‑production/foregone‑conclusion analysis	Producing the passcode is testimonial (uses contents of mind) and would incriminate Stahl; State failed to prove foregone‑conclusion elements	Court: Production here is surrender not testimonial; trial court erred by treating passcode as protected testimonial evidence and by demanding higher proof than reasonable particularity
Whether the foregone‑conclusion doctrine applies to compel a passcode	The State showed with reasonable particularity existence of a passcode, Stahl’s control of the phone, and authenticity (phone tied to Stahl by carrier records and ID)	Stahl argued the State failed to prove the phone was his or that the passcode existed in his control with required particularity	Court: State met the reasonable particularity standard; passcode is self‑authenticating and foregone‑conclusion applies
Whether compelling biometric unlocking (e.g., fingerprint) differs from passcode compulsion	State suggested less intrusive options (e.g., sending phone to Apple) and that biometric compulsion may be acceptable	Stahl relied on Fifth Amendment protections for passcodes; trial court considered mind‑content issue	Court noted biometric unlocking more like physical evidence (not testimonial) but case decided on passcode/foregone‑conclusion ground
Whether the trial court improperly required proof of phone contents beyond scope	State: warrant and independent evidence made probable cause and contents were not the issue; only passcode was sought	Trial court insisted State show photo/video existence on phone beyond reasonable particularity	Court: Trial court erred; requiring proof of contents beyond reasonable particularity departed from law

Key Cases Cited

State v. Pettis, 520 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1988) (certiorari appropriate when pretrial order irreparably impairs prosecution)
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (Fifth Amendment protects compelled testimonial communications)
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (act‑of‑production doctrine and foregone‑conclusion exception)
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000) (testimonial requirement: act must communicate facts; distinction between compelled creation and production)
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012) (reasonable particularity standard for foregone‑conclusion application)
State v. Crumbley, 143 So. 3d 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (pretrial orders that prevent State from developing evidence may be reviewable)
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (distinction between testimonial communication and compelled physical evidence)
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605 (Mass. 2014) (treating decryption/password production as potentially incriminating but discussing foregone‑conclusion)