State v. Spratlin
305 Ga. 585
| Ga. | 2019Background
- Spratlin was convicted of malice murder and a firearm offense for the shooting death of Edward Cobb; trial counsel did not call Spratlin and argued mere-presence defense.
- During the State's case, three witnesses mentioned Spratlin’s silence after the incident: a bystander (Abner) who testified he did not ask police to be called, an Alabama detective who said Spratlin made no statement when arrested, and a Georgia detective who said Spratlin "refused to make a statement" during a custodial interview. Trial counsel made no contemporaneous objections.
- The prosecutor later referenced Spratlin’s failure to tell police during closing rebuttal; counsel objected only after argument and moved for mistrial. The court gave a curative jury instruction that defendants need not make statements to police.
- Trial court granted a new trial on ineffective assistance grounds, finding counsel should have excluded testimony and prevented prosecutorial comments about post-arrest silence. The State appealed.
- The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed Strickland prejudice and whether counsel’s failure to object was deficient given unsettled law about pre-Miranda post-arrest silence and strategic choices at trial.
Issues
| Issue | Spratlin's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony about Spratlin's pre-Miranda, post-arrest silence (Alabama detective) | Counsel should have objected; such testimony improperly comments on silence and prejudiced the jury | Law is unsettled on whether pre-Miranda, non-interrogative post-arrest silence is constitutionally protected; failure to object not deficient | Not deficient — failure to object was reasonable because law is unsettled on that precise point |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony that Spratlin "refused to make a statement" when interrogated by Georgia detective (custodial invocation) | Counsel should have objected; Miranda/Doyle prohibit using custodial invocation against defendant | The remark was brief and strategic choices could justify not objecting; objecting might highlight damaging testimony about co-defendant | Not deficient — counsel’s decision was a permissible strategy; objecting could have drawn attention and lost impeachment value against co-defendant |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to prevent/protest prosecutorial closing comments about Spratlin’s silence | Counsel should have objected promptly or sought a pre‑trial in limine to bar comments; failure was deficient | State argues comments were not so prejudicial and curative instruction cured any harm | Counsel was deficient for failing to object immediately to prosecutor’s rebuttal comment about not making a statement to police |
| Whether any deficient performance was prejudicial under Strickland (i.e., reasonable probability of different outcome) | The cumulative effect of the silence testimony and prosecutor’s comments undermined confidence in the verdict | Evidence of guilt (setup of drug deal, presence with co-defendant, forensic evidence, flight and hiding) and curative instruction made prejudice unlikely | No Strickland prejudice — limited deficiency (timeliness of objection only) was not likely to change outcome; reversal of new trial affirmed (trial court’s grant reversed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings and prohibition on using post‑warning silence against defendant)
- Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (use of post‑Miranda silence for impeachment violates due process)
- Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (post‑arrest silence pre‑Miranda may be treated differently; States may allow cross‑examination under state rules)
- Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625 (1991) (Georgia evidentiary rule limiting commentary on defendant's pre‑arrest silence)
- Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180 (2016) (clarifying Strickland standards in Georgia)
- Eller v. State, 303 Ga. 373 (2018) (counsel not deficient for failing to object on unsettled question of law)
- Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803 (2015) (describing approach to Strickland prejudice review in Georgia)
- Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333 (2013) (objections to prosecutorial argument must be timely to preserve issue)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)