State v. Spivey, 368 N.C. 739

Defendant drove his car into the patio/front window of a restaurant called “Katy’s Great Eats,” injuring a patron, Christina Short. Defendant admitted intent to hurt Short but denied intent to kill.
A grand jury returned multiple indictments, including Count II charging injury to real property under N.C.G.S. § 14-127, alleging damage to “the restaurant, the property of Katy’s Great Eats.”
At trial, defendant moved to dismiss Count II for failure to identify the owner as a legal entity (arguing the corporate name is actually “Katy’s Great Eats, Inc.”); the trial court denied the motion.
Defense counsel conceded at closing that defendant struck the restaurant and asked the jury to convict on related offenses including injury to real property; the jury convicted on that count among others.
The Court of Appeals vacated the injury-to-real-property conviction, holding the indictment was fatally defective because it failed to allege that “Katy’s Great Eats” was an entity capable of owning property; the State sought discretionary review.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding the indictment need identify the parcel of real property (not necessarily the form of ownership) and that the phrasing used sufficiently identified the injured real property and gave reasonable notice.

Issue	State's Argument	Spivey's Argument	Held
Whether an indictment for injury to real property must allege the owner is a legal entity capable of owning property	The indictment tracks § 14-127, identifies the specific parcel ("the restaurant, the property of Katy’s Great Eats"), and thus gives reasonable notice; owner identity is not an essential element	The indictment is fatally defective because it fails to allege that "Katy’s Great Eats" is a legal entity (e.g., corporation) capable of owning property	Reversed Court of Appeals: owner-entity naming is not required so long as the indictment sufficiently identifies the specific real property and gives reasonable notice
Whether identification of the owner is required to avoid variance/double jeopardy in injury-to-real-property prosecutions	Owner name can be used to identify the parcel but is not required; real property itself must be identified (address preferred) and defendant could request bill of particulars if confused	Relies on precedent (Mason, Hicks, Lilly) arguing indictments must allege owner/possessor to prevent fatal variance	Held that real property is inherently unique; indictment need identify the property itself, not the owner; prior cases requiring owner naming to avoid fatal variance (to the extent inconsistent) are overruled

State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293 (discusses indictment sufficiency and purposes of charging instrument)
State v. Freeman, 314 N.C. 432 (1975 Act purpose to simplify criminal proceedings and standards for indictments)
State v. Jones, 367 N.C. 299 (bill of particulars remedy when indictment lacks needed detail)
State v. Lilly, 195 N.C. App. 697 (Court of Appeals decision requiring owner/possessor allegation for injury-to-real-property indictments)
State v. Mason, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 341 (historic rule that property must be laid truly; variance fatal)
State v. Hicks, 233 N.C. 31 (applies Mason; fatal variance where indictment misidentified property owner)
State v. Campbell, 368 N.C. 83 (requires specifying corporate/legal status when owner name does not import entity capable of owning property)
State v. Cooke, 246 N.C. 518 (malicious injury to property requires alleging rightful owner/possessor)
State v. Chamberlain, 232 N.C. App. 246 (discusses owner/possession as issue for jury in property-damage disputes)