165 Conn. App. 110
Conn. App. Ct.2016Background
- State executed a search warrant at Spence's Fairfield home at ~6:10 a.m.; officers found multiple family members present and seized a computer from the defendant’s bedroom.
- Detective Aresco asked why police were in the home; Spence asked to speak privately and was taken outside, Mirandized, and gave oral and written statements admitting possession of 150+ child pornography files.
- Spence moved to suppress: (a) his initial, pre‑Miranda response in the home and (b) the later Mirandized statements as fruit of the alleged unconstitutional prewarning questioning.
- At trial the jury convicted Spence of first‑degree possession of child pornography (50+ images); defense raised an alibi theory based on computerized file timestamps.
- Defense objected to (1) the court’s constructive‑possession instruction (arguing the jury should be required to find control of premises as well as the computer) and (2) the state’s use of rebuttal testimony about the computer clock offset (after defense elicited download times and presented an alibi).
- The trial court denied suppression, gave the possession instruction focused on control of the computer, and allowed rebuttal testimony about a nine‑hour clock discrepancy; the conviction was affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Spence's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether initial in‑home questioning required Miranda warnings (custody determination) | Not custodial: questioning was brief, informal, no handcuffs, family present, officers not brandishing weapons | Custodial: multiple officers gathered residents, reasonable person would feel not free to leave so Miranda required | Not custodial; trial court properly denied suppression of both pre‑Miranda reply and subsequent Mirandized statements |
| Whether Mirandized statements were tainted by prewarning questioning (fruit of unconstitutional interrogation) | Even if earlier remarks occurred, no custody existed; Mirandized waiver was voluntary and untainted | Prewarning exchange tainted the later statements as a continuation of the same interrogation | Waiver and Mirandized statements admissible; no taint shown |
| Whether jury instruction on constructive possession must require control of premises as well as computer | Control of the computer is sufficient to infer possession of its contents; model instructions can be tailored to facts | Instruction should require jury to find control of premises too because shared areas could permit others access | Instruction was proper; jury could reasonably infer possession from exclusive control of password‑protected computer |
| Whether trial court abused discretion allowing rebuttal testimony about computer clock offset after state rested | Rebuttal was proper because defense opened door by using download times to support alibi; state promptly investigated and disclosed; defendant could cross‑examine | Rebuttal presented new forensic evidence that should have been offered in case‑in‑chief; prejudicial | No abuse of discretion; rebuttal was responsive, defendant had notice and opportunity to cross‑examine |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (Miranda warnings required for custodial interrogation)
- State v. Mangual, 311 Conn. 182 (Conn. 2014) (factors for custody during residential searches; police‑dominated atmosphere)
- State v. Jackson, 304 Conn. 383 (Conn. 2012) (Miranda custody legal standard discussion)
- State v. Cavell, 235 Conn. 711 (Conn. 1996) (rebuttal evidence may refute defense‑introduced matters)