State v. Speights, 497 P.3d 340

Background:

Early morning 911 call reported someone banging on doors/windows and checking door knobs at a townhome community.
Officers found an unoccupied Ford Explorer parked oddly near the complainants’ unit: interior dome light on, driver’s door latched but not closed, and a partially full liquor bottle on the driver’s floorboard.
Officer Stowers briefly reached into the driver-side wheel well (twice) and Officer Nelson touched the hood; both testified the engine/compartment felt hot. Officers searched the area, found Holly Speights asleep/unsteady in the garage, located Ford keys within arm’s reach, detained her, and later obtained blood showing BAC 0.17.
Speights moved to suppress the officers’ testimony about the vehicle’s temperature, arguing the touches were warrantless searches under United States v. Jones (trespassory test) and lacked probable cause; trial court denied the motion and convicted her of DUI.
Trial court later found the officers had committed a common-law trespass but deemed the contacts reasonable; the Utah Supreme Court reviewed de novo and certified the case.
The Utah Supreme Court assumed (without deciding) the touches could be searches under Jones but held the automobile exception applied and that the final touch (Stowers’s second wheel-well contact) was supported by probable cause and an independent source of the evidence; the conviction was affirmed.

Issues:

Issue	Speights' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether momentary touches to a vehicle exterior to assess engine warmth are Fourth Amendment searches under Jones (trespass + obtaining information).	The touches were common-law trespasses made to obtain information (engine temperature) and thus were unconstitutional searches under Jones.	Jones and Katz coexist, but these brief exterior contacts did not create a protected expectation or were not trespassory in a way that invalidates the evidence.	Court did not decide whether the touches were searches under Jones; assumed arguendo they were and proceeded to analyze exceptions.
If the touches were searches, whether the automobile exception justified the warrantless contacts/evidence.	No probable cause existed to search/touch the vehicle, so the automobile exception does not apply.	Under the totality of circumstances (reckless parking, dome light, latched door, open liquor bottle, recent change when dome light turned off), probable cause existed—at least for the final wheel-well touch.	Automobile exception applies; final touch was supported by probable cause and provided an independent, lawful source for admission of engine-temperature testimony.
Whether suppression or a new trial was required because of the alleged Fourth Amendment violation.	The admission of the engine-temperature evidence violated constitutional rights and had substantial adverse effect warranting suppression or new trial.	The evidence was admissible because of probable cause and independent-source doctrine; no reversible error.	Denial of suppression and new trial affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding government trespass to an effect for the purpose of obtaining information can be a Fourth Amendment search)
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test governs many Fourth Amendment inquiries)
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile exception allows warrantless vehicle searches where probable cause exists)
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (reasonableness is the Fourth Amendment’s touchstone)
State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 1984) (Utah application of the automobile exception)
State v. Worwood, 164 P.3d 397 (Utah 2007) (probable cause defined by totality of circumstances)
United States v. Richmond, 915 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2019) (applied Jones to brief exterior contact with vehicle)