State v. Spainhower, 251 Or. App. 25

Defendant was tried for harassment; verdict guilty on May 20, 2009; defendant loudly objected; court held him in contempt and set contempt sanctions for end of underlying case.
The underlying case was continued after the court granted a new trial, delaying disposition for about nine months.
On February 11, 2010, the defendant was acquitted after retrial; prosecutor sought contempt sanctions for the May 20, 2009 conduct.
On March 1, 2010, the court imposed sanctions—two years’ bench probation, 30 days in jail with jail suspended on conditions, and fines totaling $973—based on a waiver of timely action.
The trial court relied on ORS 33.096, asserting that summary contempt may be imposed in the court’s presence; the court concluded the delay was permissible due to waiver of timely imposition.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ORS 33.096 requires timely imposition and that imposing sanctions nine months after the conduct exceeded the court’s authority.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ORS 33.096 authorizes delayed sanctions for direct contempt.	State contends ‘summary’ refers to procedure, not timing, allowing delay.	Defendant argues the delay violated timing limits and due process.	Yes; the court lacked authority due to improper timing.
What is the meaning of 'summarily' in ORS 33.096.	State relies on hybrid meaning of 'summarily' as procedure plus timing.	Defense argues 'summarily' includes timing constraints.	Hybrid content; timing is constrained by purpose and due process.
Is there a temporal limit requiring imposition of sanctions at first reasonable opportunity.	State asserts no strict immediate timing due to trial exigencies.	Defense argues immediate punishment not always required.	Sanctions must be imposed at first reasonable opportunity; delay here was impermissible.
Did waiver by defendant (or defense) affect enforceability of the sanction?	State notes waiver of timely imposition.	Waiver should not validate an impermissible delay.	Waiver does not validate excess of statutory authority.
Should the trial court have followed ORS 33.065 procedures for punitive sanctions?	State argues procedures were bypassed due to summary authority.	Defense argues preservation and procedural requirements may apply.	Issue unpreserved; court did not err to the extent discussed; reversed on timing.

Barton v. Maxwell, 325 Or 72 (1997) (limits of inherent contempt authority; timing considerations)
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (due process limitations in contempt; direct vs indirect contempt)
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) (summary contempt does not require full trial but not open-ended punishment)
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) (temporal due process constraints when delay occurs in contempt punishment)
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974) (delayed punishment after trial requires due process fundamentals)
Bailey v. City of Salem, 43 Or. App. 334 (1979) (historical view of summary contempt and need for timely punishment)