State v. Space, 980 N.W.2d 1

Information filed March 5, 2021 (aggravated DUI, third offense, and refusal); statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial deadline ran from that date.
Progression order set arraignment and a July 22, 2021 final plea/pretrial; no trial date existed before July 22.
At the July 22 hearing the district court proposed a September 20, 2021 jury trial date (more than six months after March 5); defense counsel responded “Yes” and the court scheduled the date. Speedy‑trial was not discussed.
The only other excludable time the court found was a one‑day exclusion for a discovery motion; with that exclusion the speedy period expired on September 6, 2021.
Space moved for absolute discharge on September 13, 2021; the district court granted discharge, rejecting the State’s argument that defense consent to the September 20 date created an excludable continuance or constituted invited error.
The State filed an exception; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) "continuance" under § 29‑1207(4)(b) means postponement of a previously scheduled court proceeding, and (2) agreeing to an initial trial setting outside six months is not an excludable continuance nor invited error barring discharge.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does consenting to an initial trial date outside 6 months create an excludable "continuance" under § 29‑1207(4)(b)?	State: Yes — consent to the Sept. 20 date made the delay excludable as a continuance requested/consented to by defense.	Space: No — there was no continuance because no earlier trial date was postponed; this was an initial setting.	Held: "Continuance" means postponement of a scheduled proceeding; consenting to an initial setting is not an excludable continuance.
Does the waiver sentence in § 29‑1207(4)(b) apply when defendant agrees to an initial trial date outside the statutory period?	State: Defendant should be deemed to have waived speedy‑trial rights by agreeing to the date.	Space: Waiver provision applies only when defendant requests a continuance that moves a previously set trial from inside to outside the 6‑month period.	Held: Waiver provision in § 29‑1207(4)(b) does not apply to agreeing to an initial date set outside the 6‑month period.
Can the State invoke the invited‑error doctrine to prevent discharge where defense agreed to the scheduling?	State: Yes — defense invited the scheduling error and should not benefit from it.	Space: No — judge proposed the date; defense merely answered a scheduling question and had no duty to object.	Held: Invited error doctrine does not bar discharge here; defense did not invite the court to commit the error and statutory scheme governs.

State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281, 202 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 1972) (discussed waiver and burden to bring defendant to trial)
State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749, 962 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 2021) (primary burden on State to bring accused to trial within statutory time)
State v. Gnanaprakasam, 310 Neb. 519, 967 N.W.2d 89 (Neb. 2021) (method for computing speedy‑trial deadline)
State v. Liming, 306 Neb. 475, 945 N.W.2d 882 (Neb. 2020) (continuance consent found where a scheduled proceeding was postponed)
State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 932 N.W.2d 64 (Neb. 2019) (continuance found where defendant moved to continue a hearing)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (constitutional speedy‑trial balancing and defendant’s duty to assert the right)