State v. Sowell (Slip Opinion)
148 Ohio St. 3d 554
| Ohio | 2016Background
- Anthony Sowell was indicted on an 85-count indictment after police found 10 bodies and a skull at his Cleveland home and developed evidence of additional attempted murders and sexual assaults; a jury convicted him of 11 aggravated murders and related specifications and recommended death for each count.
- The trial included contested suppression hearings (held in camera), extensive individualized voir dire (also closed at times), and a lengthy guilt and penalty phase; defense presented mental-health evidence and survivorship testimony from five victims.
- The trial court merged duplicative death specifications for sentencing, instructed the jury on felony- and course-of-conduct specifications, and the jury found multiple aggravating circumstances (course-of-conduct and kidnapping-related felony-murder specifications) for most counts.
- The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and 11 death sentences, rejecting claims including courtroom-closure error, venue change, jury-selection challenges, indictment defects, evidentiary rulings, and several claimed trial-counsel failures.
- In independent sentence review the court found aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt for each murder and concluded the death sentences were proportionate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sowell) | Defendant's Argument (State/Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Closure of suppression hearing | Closure violated Sixth Amendment public-trial right; required Waller findings and remand | Court identified overriding interest (prejudice to jury pool), closure was narrowly tailored and the record justified it; no material change would result from a public hearing | Affirmed; closure not reversible error and no new hearing required |
| Closure of individual voir dire | Closure denied public-trial right | Defense requested in-chambers individual voir dire; invited error doctrine bars challenge | Affirmed; invited error — defendant requested closure |
| Pretrial publicity / change of venue | Publicity was so pervasive as to require presumed prejudice and venue change | Extensive voir dire, few jurors excused for cause, large community pool; trial court properly screened jurors | Affirmed; no abuse of discretion denying change of venue |
| Duplicative course-of-conduct specifications | Multiple course-of-conduct specs were prejudicial and should have been excluded | Multiple specs are improper but were merged for sentencing and jury was instructed to treat them as merged | Affirmed; error not prejudicial because merging instruction and merger at sentencing cured duplicative-spec issue |
| Felony-murder unanimity instruction | Failure to require jury unanimity on alternative theories (principal or prior calculation) led to possible patchwork verdicts | Jury unanimously convicted on aggravated-murder counts alleging prior calculation and design; no risk of nonunanimity affecting verdict | Affirmed; omission was error but not plain error under these facts |
| Duplicate rape counts ("carbon-copy") | Identical counts deprived notice and double-jeopardy protection (citing Valentine) | Counts alleged specific dates and victims; victims testified to two distinct acts on those dates, distinguishing facts from Valentine | Affirmed; Valentine distinguishable, no due-process defect |
| Admission of defendant statements and impact on outcome | Suppressed statements could have changed result | Independent, overwhelming physical and witness evidence would have produced same outcome without statements | Affirmed; any closure error harmless because no material change would result |
| Mitigation / penalty instructions (presumption of life; mercy instruction) | Requested instructions (presumption of life, mercy) should have been given | Court’s instructions adequately conveyed State’s burden and covered requested ideas; plea offer not admissible as mitigating evidence | Affirmed; trial court’s instructions sufficient and plea-offer inadmissible |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel | Counsel should have conceded guilt to focus on penalty and preserved more objections | Strategic choices within range of reasonable professional assistance; no Strickland prejudice shown | Affirmed; ineffective-assistance claims rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (U.S. 1984) (public-trial right extends to suppression hearings; closure requires overriding interest, narrow tailoring, consideration of alternatives, and specific findings)
- Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (U.S. 1966) (trial court must take strong measures to protect jury impartiality from prejudicial publicity)
- Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (U.S. 1961) (extensive pretrial publicity may require presumed prejudice and venirewide disqualification)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (facts increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to jury)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (U.S. 2002) (capital sentencing facts that expose defendant to death must be found by a jury)
- Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (U.S. 1992) (defendant entitled to exclude jurors who would automatically impose death)
- Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2005) (indictments with undifferentiated, identical counts over broad time frames can violate due process and double-jeopardy protections)
- Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (U.S. 2004) (conceding guilt can be reasonable strategy in capital case when aimed at saving defendant’s life)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- State v. Mitts, 81 Ohio St.3d 223 (Ohio 1998) (multiple course-of-conduct specifications are duplicative and must be merged)