State v. Sosa-Hurtado, 455 P.3d 63

Background

In a Salt Lake City smoke shop Sosa‑Hurtado returned with a friend after a prior fight, entered armed with an assault rifle, shot at Isabel (wounding him), then shot and killed Stephen a few seconds later; Suarez‑Campos (the friend) testified for the State under a plea agreement.
State charged Sosa‑Hurtado with aggravated murder under Utah Code § 76‑5‑202(1)(c) (actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim and actor), plus multiple firearm counts; jury convicted on aggravated murder and related counts.
On appeal Sosa‑Hurtado argued (1) insufficient evidence for the § 76‑5‑202(1)(c) aggravator and (2) the district court abused discretion by refusing to consider late‑filed affidavits and by denying his motion for a new trial (claims included Brady/Giglio, doctored receipts/prosecutorial misconduct, and an ex parte juror‑timing communication).
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed: it clarified that the § 76‑5‑202(1)(c) aggravator can be satisfied by acts that (within a brief span) form a “concatenating series of events” leading to the murder — the risk need not arise from the single fatal act — and identified relevant factors (temporal proximity, spatial proximity, and whether the third party was threatened).
The court held a reasonable jury could infer Sosa‑Hurtado knowingly created a great risk of death to Isabel (shot at Isabel seconds before killing Stephen; small confines of the shop; intent to harm), and it upheld the district court’s exclusion of untimely affidavits under Utah R. Crim. P. 24 and denial of a new trial on the merits (no material Brady prejudice; receipts were excluded/apology; ex parte juror communication was brief and non‑substantive).
Justice Pearce dissented in part: he would confine the aggravator to danger created by the manner/act that actually caused the death and would vacate the aggravator here, arguing the fatal shots did not put Isabel at a likelihood/high probability of great risk of death.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Sosa‑Hurtado)	Held
Scope of § 76‑5‑202(1)(c) (“great risk of death”)	Aggravator may be satisfied by acts that, within a brief span, form a concatenating series of events surrounding the homicide (Pierre/Johnson line).	Aggravator must be tied to the single murderous act that caused the death; third‑party risk must result from that fatal act.	Court adopted the broader Pierre/Johnson approach: risk need not result from the precise fatal act if created within a brief span as part of a concatenating series; relevant factors include temporal/spatial proximity and whether third party was threatened.
Sufficiency of evidence that defendant knowingly created great risk to Isabel	Shots at Isabel seconds before killing Stephen, close quarters, and intent to harm show Isabel was within the zone of danger; jury could infer concatenated events.	Fatal shots at Stephen did not place Isabel at a likelihood/high probability of death (Isabel was on the ground, defendant had his back, no proof of ricochet/high risk).	Evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Sosa‑Hurtado knowingly created a great risk of death to Isabel; aggravated murder verdict affirmed.
District court’s exclusion of late‑filed affidavits under Rule 24 and denial of leave	Rule 24 requires supporting affidavits/evidence to accompany motion within the ten‑day period or a timely request for extension; exclusion is within trial court discretion.	Late affidavits should be considered absent delay or prejudice; denial was hyper‑technical and unfair.	Court affirmed: trial court acted within discretion to exclude untimely filings (no timely request for extension) and to deny an evidentiary hearing; adherence to Rule 24 upheld.
Merits of motion for new trial (Brady/Giglio, doctored receipts, ex parte jury contact)	Even if some prosecutorial error occurred, defense suffered no material prejudice: plea terms known to defense, receipts were excluded and State apologized, juror communication was brief/disclosed.	State’s misrepresentations and allegedly doctored receipts and the judge’s ex parte juror contact deprived defendant of a fair trial and warrant a new trial.	Court affirmed denial of new trial: no Brady prejudice shown; receipts were excluded and apology given so no reversible prosecutorial misconduct; ex parte contact was brief, procedural, and non‑prejudicial.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977) (aggravator may be satisfied where acts creating risk occurred within a brief span forming a concatenating series of events)
State v. Johnson, 740 P.2d 1264 (Utah 1987) (clarified § 76‑5‑202(1)(c): examine manner of killing, defendant’s intent/knowledge, and whether another was within the zone of danger)
State v. Sosa‑Hurtado, 424 P.3d 948 (Utah Ct. App. 2018) (court of appeals’ three‑factor formulation—temporal, spatial, and direct/indirect threat—endorsed by Supreme Court)
State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892 (Utah 2012) (brief, disclosed, non‑objectionable ex parte juror communications are not presumed prejudicial)
State v. Mitchell, 163 P.3d 737 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (Rule 24 requires affidavits/evidence accompanying new‑trial motion or a timely request for extension)
State v. Bisner, 37 P.3d 1073 (Utah 2001) (Brady violations do not warrant reversal when the defense knew or reasonably should have known the evidence or was not materially prejudiced)
State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1988) (standard for finding prosecutorial conduct so outrageous as to violate due process)