State v. Sommers, 2014 MT 315

Sommers was found passed out in the driver’s seat of a running truck at a late-night welfare check; officer smelled alcohol, observed slurred speech and poor balance, and arrested him for DUI.
Sommers refused a breath test; a blood warrant showed BAC .25; he had three prior DUI convictions, so charged with fourth-or-subsequent offense.
Sommers’ defense: his truck was disabled and could not be moved when found (later shown to have a broken drive‑shaft coupling), so he lacked “actual physical control.”
At trial, the district court instructed the jury that actual physical control includes present bodily restraint or domination and added: “It does not matter that the vehicle is incapable of moving.”
The jury convicted; Sommers appealed, arguing the instruction misstated law and the court erred denying his motion for acquittal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether jury instruction correctly defined “actual physical control”	State relied on instruction allowing conviction even if vehicle was immobile	Sommers: immobility can preclude actual physical control; instruction misstated law	Instruction misstated law by implying immobility is irrelevant; reversible error
Whether a person can be in “actual physical control” of a disabled vehicle	State: defendant can still have control depending on circumstances	Sommers: disabled/immovable vehicle negates control	Court: immobility is relevant; use totality‑of‑circumstances; immobility can preclude control depending on facts
Whether district court erred in denying motion for acquittal	State: evidence supported control inference	Sommers: insufficiency because vehicle was inoperable	Court: denial premised on incorrect legal standard; remand to reconsider motion under correct standard
Remedy required	State: uphold conviction	Sommers: new trial or acquittal	Court: reverse and remand; if acquittal motion again denied, grant new trial with correct instructions

State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243, 321 P.2d 615 (Mont. 1958) (defined actual physical control as present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation over a vehicle)
State v. Taylor, 203 Mont. 284, 661 P.2d 33 (Mont. 1983) (immobility at arrest does not preclude control where vehicle became disabled as a result of defendant’s driving)
State v. Gebhardt, 238 Mont. 90, 775 P.2d 1261 (Mont. 1989) (same principle as Taylor where circumstantial evidence showed prior control)
State v. Robison, 281 Mont. 64, 931 P.2d 706 (Mont. 1997) (reversed instruction that overbroadly defined actual physical control to include any intoxicated vehicle occupant)
Turner v. State, 244 Mont. 151, 795 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1990) (affirmed actual physical control where defendant was pushing his motorcycle)
State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1992) (circumstantial evidence that defendant drove vehicle to its resting place supports inference of actual physical control)