State v. Smith, 2020 Ohio 6694

Miranda Smith was indicted on multiple counts and pleaded no contest to amended rape (child under 13) and burglary; other counts were dismissed per plea deal.
Alleged conduct (June–Sept 2019): Smith directed her then two‑year‑old son to insert a sex toy into her vagina, recorded the act, and sent the video to an ex‑boyfriend.
Trial court denied Smith’s motions to dismiss and to suppress; Smith admitted the factual allegations at plea hearing; court sentenced her to 10 years to life on the rape count, consecutive to two years for burglary.
On appeal Smith argued the rape statute (R.C. 2907.02) does not criminalize causing another to insert an object into the defendant, and that the conduct—if criminal—is properly charged under gross sexual imposition (R.C. 2907.05).
The court considered statutory definitions: “sexual conduct” includes insertion of any object into another’s vaginal opening; “sexual contact” (gross sexual imposition) is limited to touching and does not include penetration.
The court held the rape statute covers this conduct because the plain language requires insertion of an object into another person, not that the defendant be the inserter; thus Smith’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Smith’s conduct (having a child insert an object into her vagina) qualifies as "sexual conduct" supporting a rape conviction under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b)	The conduct involved penetration by an object into another person and therefore falls within the statutory definition of "sexual conduct" and rape	The rape statute requires the defendant to be the one inserting an object; because it lacks "cause another" language found in gross sexual imposition, the conduct is not rape but at most gross sexual imposition; ambiguities favor defendant under lenity	The court held the statute’s plain language covers insertion of an object into another person regardless of who performs the insertion; rape conviction upheld

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for sufficiency review: whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio 1997) (Ohio guidance on sufficiency versus weight of the evidence)
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio 1991) (Jenkins/Jenks standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (U.S. 1971) (rule of lenity: ambiguities in criminal statutes construed in defendant’s favor)
State v. Simpson, 109 N.E.3d 595 (Ohio 2018) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo; apply plain language if unambiguous)
State v. Blanton, 110 N.E.3d 1 (Ohio App. 2018) (district court discussion of sufficiency review under Thompkins/Jackson)