State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957

Background

In 1983, Brian D. Smith (age 16 at the time) pled guilty to burglary and Class IA kidnapping; the State dismissed charges including first-degree murder in exchange for the plea. Smith was originally sentenced to life imprisonment for kidnapping (concurrent with a 5–20 year burglary term).
Following Graham and Miller, Smith filed habeas relief; the district court vacated his original life sentence and remanded for resentencing.
At resentencing (2015), the court received evidence on Smith’s youth, psychological evaluations (1983 and 2015), co-defendant Dale Nollen’s statement, prison disciplinary records, and expert/deposition evidence about adolescent brain development.
The State argued Smith should receive a sentence comparable to Nollen (resentenced to 90 years–life) and suggested a life term was lawful; Smith argued this breached the 1983 plea and moved to withdraw his plea.
The district court overruled plea-breach claims, considered mitigating youth-related factors but emphasized Smith’s culpability and multiple opportunities to desist, and sentenced Smith to 90 years–to–life; parole eligibility depended on which “good time” law applied.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: it held no plea breach occurred, applied current good-time law (making Smith parole-eligible at 62), rejected Smith’s Graham-based Eighth Amendment challenge to the term-of-years sentence, and found no abuse of discretion in sentencing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether State breached the 1983 plea agreement by advocating for a life-type sentence	Smith: State’s resentencing advocacy for a sentence equivalent to murder/life breached the agreement to dismiss murder charge	State: Plea contained no restriction; mandatory life was a contemplated possible result; State may recommend any lawful sentence	No breach; court enforces only agreed terms; State did not violate plea agreement
Which good-time law controls parole eligibility after original sentence vacated	Smith: Old (1983) good-time law should apply, making parole eligibility later	State: Current good-time law applies, yielding earlier parole eligibility	Current good-time law applies because original sentence was voided; parole eligibility at age 62
Whether 90 years–to–life for juvenile nonhomicide kidnapping violates Graham (Eighth Amendment)	Smith: 90-to-life is a de facto life-without-parole; violates Graham’s requirement of a meaningful opportunity for release	State: Sentence allows a meaningful, realistic chance for release (parole eligibility at 62, before average life expectancy); Graham not violated	No Graham violation: sentence affords meaningful opportunity for release and is not equivalent to life-without-parole here
Whether sentence is excessive / abuse of discretion	Smith: Sentence excessive given youth, immaturity, rehabilitation evidence	State: Aggravating facts and culpability justify lengthy term within statutory limits	No abuse of discretion; court properly considered mitigating and aggravating factors and imposed a lawful term

Key Cases Cited

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders; requires meaningful opportunity for release)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
State v. Schrein, 247 Neb. 256 (1995) (good-time law applied is law in effect when convictions become final)
State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013) (analysis of when a term-of-years sentence constitutes a de facto life without parole under Graham)