State v. Smith, 892 N.W.2d 52

Background

In 1983, at age 16, Brian D. Smith pled guilty to burglary and Class IA kidnapping (victim later found dead); other charges including felony murder were dismissed as part of the plea. Smith was originally sentenced to life imprisonment for kidnapping concurrent with a 5–20 year burglary term.
Following Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, Smith filed habeas relief in 2015; the district court vacated his original life sentence under Graham and remanded for resentencing.
At resentencing the court received historical and current psychological evaluations, co-defendant Nollen’s statement, Smith’s 1983 presentence materials, prison misconduct/progress records, and expert testimony about adolescent brain development and Smith’s low present risk for violence.
The State argued Smith should receive a sentence comparable to co-defendant Nollen (not less than 90 years to life); Smith contended the State’s advocacy breached the 1983 plea agreement and that a 90–to–life term was a de facto life-without-parole sentence violating Graham and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The district court considered mitigating juvenile factors but emphasized the crime’s horrific facts and numerous opportunities Smith had to avoid the homicide; it imposed 90 years’ to life and expressed uncertainty about which good-time law applied.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: it found no plea-breach, ruled the current good-time law applies (making Smith parole-eligible at 62), held the sentence does not violate Graham, and found no abuse of discretion in the sentence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Smith)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Did the State breach the 1983 plea agreement by arguing for a murder-like sentence?	State’s resentencing advocacy for a life-equivalent term breached the agreement to dismiss murder-related exposure.	Plea terms did not limit the State’s sentencing recommendations; life was a contemplated possible sentence.	No breach; court enforces only agreed terms and nothing in the plea restricted the State from recommending life.
Which good-time law governs parole eligibility after resentencing following a voided sentence?	Smith argued for application of the older (1983) good-time law, which would delay parole eligibility.	State (and court) treated current good-time law as applicable.	Current good-time law applies because original sentence was vacated as void; convictions become final on entry of mandate, so parole eligibility is calculated under the law in effect when the new sentence becomes final (parole elig. at 62).
Does a 90-years-to-life term for a juvenile nonhomicide offender violate Graham as a de facto life-without-parole?	90–to–life functionally denies a meaningful opportunity for release and thus violates Graham and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.	The sentence permits a meaningful, realistic opportunity for release (parole eligibility at 62), so it complies with Graham.	No Graham violation: parole eligibility at 62 (≈16 years before average life expectancy) provides a meaningful opportunity for release; sentence upheld.
Was the 90–to–life sentence excessive or an abuse of discretion?	Smith urged leniency based on youth, immaturity, susceptibility to peer influence, rehabilitative record, and low present risk.	The court emphasized the crime’s severity, violence, and multiple opportunities to abandon the offense; statutory factors support a long term.	No abuse of discretion: the sentencing court considered mitigating juvenile factors but reasonably weighed them against offense gravity and imposed a sentence within statutory limits.

Key Cases Cited

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment bars life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders; juveniles must have a meaningful opportunity for release)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment; courts must consider youth-related mitigating factors)
State v. Schrein, 247 Neb. 256 (Neb. 1995) (good-time law applied is the law in effect when convictions become final)
State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013) (analysis of when a long term-of-years may constitute a de facto life-without-parole under Graham)