State v. Smith, 146 A.3d 1189

Background

Stephanie L. Smith was indicted for a theft scheme aggregating $47,460.02, charged as theft ≥ $10,000 and < $100,000 (potentially up to 15 years).
The State and Smith negotiated a binding plea: guilty to Count 1, agreed cap 5 years (all but 30–90 days suspended), five years supervised probation, and restitution of $47,460.02; remaining counts to be nolle prossed.
At the plea hearing the prosecutor described the binding-range deal, the judge conditionally agreed ("if I am not surprised") and then accepted the factual basis and the guilty plea, expressly stating he would sentence within the attorneys’ recommended ranges and calling it an "ABA plea."
After a colloquy and examination, the judge diverged from the agreed disposition: instead of a conviction with a 30–90 day actual jail component, he entered Probation Before Judgment (PBJ), ordered 60 days (converted to home detention), and deferred imposition under Crim. Proc. §6-220.
The State immediately objected and appealed, arguing the PBJ was a downward deviation from the binding plea agreement without the State’s consent, making the sentence inherently illegal under Rule 4-345(a).
The Court of Special Appeals reviewed de novo whether the judge had approved the plea agreement and whether the sentence violated Rule 4-243(c)(3); it concluded the plea was accepted and the lower court’s PBJ breached the binding agreement.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Smith)	Held
Whether the trial judge approved and bound himself to the plea agreement before accepting the guilty plea	Judge bound himself to the plea terms when he said he would sentence within the attorneys’ recommended ranges and accepted the plea	Judge’s acceptance was conditional; defense emphasizes the timing/sequence (which came first)	Court held the judge had approved the plea agreement before sentencing; acceptance can be simultaneous and need not use "magic words"
Whether imposing PBJ (no conviction) after accepting a binding plea that contemplated a conviction and restitution is an illegal downward deviation without State consent	PBJ was a sentence below the plea’s floor and therefore inherently illegal under Rule 4-345(a) and Rule 4-243(c)(3)	PBJ benefited Smith and State’s delayed objection/ silence during the judge’s colloquy amounted to implied consent or waiver; also argued defendant’s understanding defines the agreement	Court held PBJ was an unauthorized downward deviation; State’s immediate objection was timely and silence during the judge’s explanation did not imply consent
Whether a defendant’s subjective understanding of the plea controls its interpretation when the State is the aggrieved party	State argued objective agreement terms and judge’s binding approval control; defendant’s subjective belief is irrelevant to State’s grievance	Smith argued a reasonable defendant would not have thought PBJ was excluded and that defendant’s understanding defines the bargain	Court rejected defendant’s subjective-definition theory; plaintiff’s (State’s) expectations and the judge’s binding approval control meaning in State-initiated challenges
Whether the State may appeal and obtain correction of a sentence that is illegal because it is more favorable than the binding plea	State asserted right to appeal inherently illegal sentences and seek resentencing	Smith contended a non-conviction might not be less favorable and State waived objection	Court affirmed State may appeal; reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding both parties have parity to enforce plea terms

Key Cases Cited

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (fairness to both accuser and accused guides due process analysis)
Sweetwine v. State, 288 Md. 199 (1980) (early recognition of plea-bargain parity and enforcement)
Dotson v. State, 321 Md. 515 (1991) (plea bargains essential to court administration; enforceable expectations)
Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161 (1994) (State entitled to fairness/equity when plea agreement breached)
Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568 (2010) (whether a court violated plea terms is reviewed de novo)
Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475 (2004) (once plea accepted, court must impose agreed sentence if conditions fulfilled)
Poole v. State, 321 Md. 482 (1991) (court must impose agreed sentence following acceptance of plea)
Bonilla v. State, 443 Md. 1 (2015) (a sentence below a binding plea agreement without State consent is inherently illegal)