State v. Smith
288 Neb. 797
| Neb. | 2014Background
- In 1983 Brian D. Smith (age 16 at offense, 17 at sentencing) pled guilty to burglary and kidnapping after abducting a doughnut shop employee; victim’s body was recovered before sentencing. Kidnapping carried a mandatory life sentence; court imposed life imprisonment plus concurrent 5–20 years for burglary.
- Smith’s convictions and sentences have been final for over 30 years; he remains in custody (transferred to Missouri).
- In 2013 Smith filed a pro se motion in Washington County district court seeking to have his life sentence declared void under Graham v. Florida, which prohibits life-without-parole for juveniles who did not commit homicide.
- The district court held it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion because Smith had not pursued a recognized Nebraska procedure (the Postconviction Act) and his sentence was currently valid; the court dismissed the motion after an evidentiary hearing with counsel.
- Smith appealed, arguing Graham should be applied retroactively to invalidate his life sentence; the Supreme Court of Nebraska evaluated whether the district court had jurisdiction before reaching the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider Smith’s motion challenging his sentence under Graham | Smith: his sentence is void under Graham and may be attacked at any time via common-law proceedings | State: Smith must use the Nebraska Postconviction Act; he did not and the motion is time-barred, so court lacks jurisdiction | Court: No jurisdiction; Smith had a postconviction remedy and failed to timely file, so common-law remedy not available |
| Whether Graham v. Florida applies retroactively to Smith’s final sentence | Smith: Graham's prohibition on LWOP for nonhomicide juveniles invalidates his life sentence | State: Procedural—Smith did not raise it timely under the Postconviction Act; court did not reach retroactivity on merits | Court: Did not reach the retroactivity question because of lack of jurisdiction |
| Whether a new common-law procedure should be recognized for time-barred claims | Smith: allow a common-law collateral attack because § 29-3001(4) bars late postconviction relief | State: Recognizing such a procedure would undermine the legislature’s statute of limitations | Court: Declined to create a new procedure; prior cases limit common-law remedy to rare cases without any postconviction forum |
| Whether this case fits the narrow exceptions (never in custody or no available postconviction remedy) allowing common-law relief | Smith: sought relief under common-law despite availability of postconviction statute | State: Smith was in custody and postconviction remedy existed (though time-barred) | Court: Not an exception case (unlike Ewert/Yuma); postconviction act was available, so no common-law relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (constitutional rule forbidding life without parole for juvenile offenders in nonhomicide cases)
- State v. Dunster, 270 Neb. 773 (2005) (refused to create a new common-law procedure when a statutory postconviction remedy exists)
- State v. Gonzalez, 285 Neb. 940 (2013) (Postconviction Act is primary means for collateral constitutional attacks)
- State v. Ewert, 194 Neb. 203 (1975) (common-law relief allowed where defendant was never "in custody" and postconviction statute inapplicable)
- State v. Yuma, 286 Neb. 244 (2013) (applied common-law remedy where Postconviction Act was never available to assert the claim)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (ineffective-assistance rule regarding advising noncitizen defendants of immigration consequences)