State v. Smith
319 Or. App. 388
| Or. Ct. App. | 2022Background
- Defendant lived across from an apartment whose residents were predominantly LGBTQ+ and some had AIDS; over months he used homophobic slurs toward them.
- On the day in question, after being ignored, defendant threatened to kill the residents and to blow up their building while using homophobic epithets.
- State charged defendant under ORS 166.155(1)(c)(A) (2017), which makes it a crime to intentionally, because of a person’s perceived protected characteristic, subject that person to alarm by threatening serious physical injury or to commit a felony against them.
- Defendant demurred, arguing ORS 166.155(1)(c)(A) is facially unconstitutional under Article I, §8 of the Oregon Constitution and the First Amendment.
- Trial court denied the demurrer; defendant pleaded no contest while reserving the right to appeal the constitutional ruling.
- Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the demurrer and defendant’s conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ORS 166.155(1)(c)(A) is overbroad under Article I, §8 (Robertson framework) | The statute targets forbidden effects (alarm from threats) and can be reasonably construed to reach only proscribable threats (imminent, unequivocal, objectively serious threats with specific intent). | The statute is facially overbroad and chills protected expression because it can criminalize non‑threatening or non‑imminent speech. | Statute is a Robertson category‑two law but not overbroad when narrowly construed (alarm = actual fear of imminent serious personal violence; threats must be unequivocal and intentionally made). Demurrer denial affirmed. |
| Whether ORS 166.155(1)(c)(A) is an impermissible content‑based restriction under the First Amendment | The statute punishes unprotected threats and thus is not a content‑based prohibition of ideas; it targets violent threats motivated by bias, not mere expression of bias. | Because the statute requires bias motivation, it unlawfully discriminates on the basis of content/ viewpoint (impermissible under R.A.V.). | Statute is not a content‑based First Amendment violation: it criminalizes threats (unprotected speech) motivated by bias, not the expression of bias itself; demurrer denial affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402 (establishes Article I, §8 analytical framework and categories)
- State v. Moyle, 299 Or 691 (narrowly construed "alarm" to mean actual fear of imminent personal violence)
- State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294 (applied Moyle narrowing to stalking statute)
- State v. Johnson, 345 Or 190 (harassment provision facially invalid for lacking imminency requirement)
- State v. Babson, 355 Or 383 (discusses Robertson categories and analysis)
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (struck bias‑motivated ordinance as impermissible content‑based regulation)
- Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (principle that government cannot disfavor speech based on ideas/opinions)
