883 N.W.2d 738
S.D.2016Background
- In March 2015 Slotsky was charged with unauthorized ingestion, DUI, driving while license revoked, and speeding; she eventually agreed to plead guilty to ingestion in exchange for dismissal of other charges and the State's recommendation of placement in Hope Court with no jail time.
- At the August 2015 change-of-plea hearing the plea and the State’s recommendation (Hope Court, no jail) were placed on the record and the plea was accepted.
- At the September 2015 sentencing hearing the prosecutor stated concerns about additional serious charges in Tripp County and Slotsky’s criminal history, expressing doubt about her ability to maintain sobriety and obey laws. The prosecutor said she still had no objection to Hope Court but put those concerns on the record.
- Slotsky objected, contending the prosecutor’s remarks breached the plea agreement by implicitly arguing for a harsher sentence.
- The court sentenced Slotsky to five years in prison with one year suspended. She appealed, arguing the State breached the plea agreement; the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing before a different judge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the State breach the plea agreement by failing to recommend Hope Court and no jail time? | Slotsky: the plea required the State to recommend Hope Court and no jail; the prosecutor’s sentencing remarks effectively urged a harsher sentence, breaching the agreement. | State: it never objected to Hope Court placement or affirmatively asked for penitentiary time; it merely put concerns on the record and did not renege. | Yes. The Court found the State materially and substantially breached the plea by implying a harsher sentence rather than recommending Hope Court and no jail. |
| What standard governs enforcement/remedies for breached plea agreements? | Slotsky: (implicit) Santobello and state precedent require fulfillment of prosecutorial promises; remedy includes specific performance or withdrawal. | State: (implicit) prosecutor may explain positions at sentencing without breaching if not explicitly recommending prison. | Court: Apply ordinary contract principles; Santobello requires promises that induced a plea be fulfilled; defendant is entitled to a remedy for breach regardless of prosecutor’s intent. |
| Is resentencing before a different judge required as remedy? | Slotsky: (seeking enforcement) specific performance — resentencing consistent with the plea before a different judge. | State: (implicit/argued via concurrence) remand to the same judge is acceptable; reassignment is not always necessary. | Majority: Remand for resentencing before a different judge is the appropriate remedy; longstanding state precedent mandates reassignment in breach-of-plea cases. |
| Must the court determine whether the sentencing judge was actually influenced by the breach? | Slotsky: not necessary; once breach occurs remedy is required. | State: (implicit) whether judge was influenced matters. | Court: Whether the judge was influenced is legally irrelevant; inquiry focuses on whether the prosecutor met its obligation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (when a plea rests on a prosecutor's promise, that promise must be fulfilled; state courts have discretion over remedies)
- State v. Bracht, 573 N.W.2d 176 (S.D. 1997) (remedy for breach: resentencing before a different judge to enforce specific performance)
- State v. Waldner, 692 N.W.2d 187 (S.D. 2005) (apply contract principles and implied duty of good faith to plea agreements)
- State v. Morrison, 759 N.W.2d 118 (S.D. 2008) (prosecutorial breach entitles defendant to remedy regardless of inadvertence; do not inquire into whether judge was influenced)
- United States v. Corsentino, 685 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1982) (when government breaches by taking a sentencing position, resentencing before another judge best assures compliance)
- United States v. Funchess, 422 F.3d 698 (8th Cir. 2005) (Santobello does not per se require reassignment where judge was not exposed to prejudicial information)
- United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977) (three-factor test for whether reassignment on remand is required)