State v. Sledge, 149 Ohio St. 3d 1241

Bryan Sledge pleaded no contest in 2014 to two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of rape based on alleged abuse of two young children; Judge Gene Zmuda sentenced him to 17 years.
In 2016 the Sixth District Court of Appeals vacated Sledge’s no-contest plea, concluding it was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made; the case was remanded for trial.
Sledge filed an affidavit of disqualification under R.C. 2701.03 seeking to bar Judge Zmuda from presiding, alleging bias because Zmuda called him a “predator” and a “vile human being” at the original sentencing.
Judge Zmuda responded, explaining the comments were based on the prior record, his sentencing rationale, and affirmed that on remand Sledge enjoys the presumption of innocence and the state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Chief Justice reviewed the affidavit and Zmuda’s response and denied disqualification, finding the sentencing comments insufficient to show inability to preside impartially at trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Judge Zmuda must be disqualified for bias due to derogatory sentencing remarks	Sledge: Zmuda’s calling him a “predator” and “vile human being” shows bias and incapacity to be fair on remand	Zmuda: Comments arose from the record and sentencing context; he will treat Sledge as presumed innocent on remand	Denied — isolated, record-based sentencing remarks do not overcome presumption of judicial impartiality
Whether harsh sentencing language ordinarily requires disqualification on resentencing or retrial	Sledge: (implied) prior harsh language undermines judge’s fairness	State/Zmuda: Harsh comments during sentencing are often permitted and reflect condemnation, not disqualifying bias	Held: Judicial sentencing criticism alone typically does not warrant disqualification
Whether R.C. 2701.03 is the only avenue to challenge judicial bias	Zmuda (in his response): asserted the affidavit process is the only avenue	Chief Justice / opinion: Contrary — bias claims can also be raised on appeal; failure to raise on appeal may forfeit the issue	Clarified: An affidavit is not the only avenue; appellate procedures also address judicial-bias claims
Burden to show bias sufficient for disqualification	Sledge: must show judge cannot fairly preside (by his affidavit)	Zmuda: presumption that judges follow law; appearance of bias must be compelling to overcome that presumption	Held: Presumption of impartiality stands; Sledge did not overcome it

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (judge’s adverse impressions formed from proceedings are generally not grounds for recusal)
In re Disqualification of Winkler, 986 N.E.2d 996 (Ohio 2013) (sentencing comments ordinarily do not create disqualifying bias)
In re Disqualification of Sutula, 74 N.E.3d 449 (Ohio 2016) (disqualification appropriate where judge’s sentencing conduct and use of extrajudicial sources undermined fairness)
In re Disqualification of George, 798 N.E.2d 23 (Ohio 2003) (presumption that judges follow law and are unbiased)
State v. LaMar, 767 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio 2002) (criminal trial before a biased judge denies due process)
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (due-process/biased-judge principle)