State v. Slater, 486 P.3d 873

Samuel Slater was charged with felony violation of a domestic-violence no-contact order (DVNCO) after an August 2016 incident.
He missed a single trial-call hearing on September 8, 2017; the court issued a bench warrant and Slater returned about a month later to quash the warrant.
The State added a bail-jumping charge based on the failure to appear (FTA); Slater moved to sever, arguing the FTA evidence would be inadmissible propensity evidence under ER 404(b) and unduly prejudicial under ER 403.
Two judges admitted the FTA as evidence of flight/consciousness of guilt and denied severance; the prosecutor repeatedly invoked the FTA in closing to argue Slater’s guilt.
The jury convicted Slater of both counts; the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding a single FTA followed by a prompt motion to quash is not flight evidence and ordering severance for separate trials.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of a single FTA as "flight" evidence to infer consciousness of guilt	Single FTA may be admitted as circumstantial flight evidence (relying on Jefferson and Cobb)	A single FTA plus prompt quash is speculative and not flight; cannot support consciousness-of-guilt inference	A lone FTA with a timely motion to quash is not flight evidence and cannot be used to infer consciousness of guilt
Motion to sever / cross-admissibility under ER 404(b) and ER 403	Evidence of bail-jumping is cross-admissible to prove consciousness of guilt for the underlying charge; joinder promotes judicial economy	FTA evidence is not cross-admissible and would invite impermissible propensity inferences and unfair prejudice	Trial courts abused their discretion: the FTA was not cross-admissible under ER 404(b)/403 and prejudice outweighed judicial economy; convictions reversed and charges severed
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument	Prosecutor argued reasonable inferences from admitted evidence; any prejudice could be cured by instruction	Prosecutor repeatedly equated the FTA with guilt and urged propensity inferences, compounding prejudice	Court did not need to resolve definitively but observed the prosecutor’s comments were improper, amplified the error, and were unlikely curable by instruction

Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408 (U.S. 1896) (early Supreme Court discussion: flight evidence may be considered but is not conclusive and may arise for innocent reasons)
State v. Bruton, 66 Wn.2d 111 (Wash. 1965) (court: flight inference must be substantial, not speculative)
State v. Jefferson, 11 Wn. App. 568 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (court of appeals held unexplained FTA can be considered for consciousness-of-guilt in certain facts)
State v. Cobb, 22 Wn. App. 221 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (FTA with extended concealment treated as circumstantial evidence of guilt where unexplained)
United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977) (four-part framework for evaluating strength of inferences from conduct to flight to guilt)
In re Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696 (Wash. 2012) (prosecutorial-misconduct standard for closing argument; some improper argument can be incurable)
State v. Bluford, 188 Wn.2d 298 (Wash. 2017) (severance analysis: where evidence is not cross-admissible, judicial-economy justification is weakened)