State v. Skipwith
165 A.3d 1211
| Conn. | 2017Background
- Victim Tabatha Cornell (mother of decedent Briana Washington) had constitutional rights under Conn. Const., amend. XXIX to be notified of plea hearings and to make oral or written statements regarding plea and sentencing.
- Cornell’s counsel, Jeffrey Brownstein, sent written notice to the prosecuting office requesting contact before any plea or disposition and stating Cornell opposed suspended sentence and pleas avoiding an admission of guilt; no substantive response was received.
- A victim advocate communicated with defense/prosecution and with Brownstein about case status; Cornell and counsel were unavailable for jury selection but family members attended and discussed potential weaknesses in the case with prosecutors.
- Prosecutor Jason Germain presented a nolo contendere plea agreement (total effective 10 years, execution suspended after 2) to the court; the court asked the prosecutor if family was contacted, received a vague reply implying notification, accepted the plea, and later sentenced the defendant.
- Cornell learned of the plea only after sentencing and moved to correct an illegal sentence; the trial court and state’s attorney acknowledged failures, apologized, and gave Cornell an opportunity to be heard post hoc, but appellate relief to vacate the sentence was unavailable under current law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cornell’s constitutional and statutory victims’ rights were violated when plea was accepted without adequate victim notice or opportunity to be heard | Cornell argued her amendment XXIX and §54-91c rights were denied because counsel’s written notice was ignored and the court accepted plea without ensuring she was notified or heard | State argued procedures were followed sufficiently; court relied on prosecutor’s representations and post-sentencing opportunity to speak remedied any defect | Court (McDonald, J., concurring) concluded rights were violated but appellate relief to vacate the sentence was barred; concurrence urges supervisory reforms and prophylactic procedures for trial courts |
| Whether this court can vacate sentence as remedy for victims’ rights violation | Cornell sought vacatur of plea/sentence to vindicate rights | State relied on constitutional amendment language and statutes precluding appellate relief or vacatur for victims’ rights violations | Held that vacating sentence is a form of appellate relief and is precluded by the amendment’s bar and existing statutory framework; court lacks authority to grant that relief |
| What procedural duties trial courts/prosecutors must follow to protect victims’ rights at plea acceptance | Cornell urged enforcement and an effective remedy | State cited existing statutory notification requirements and argued those control | Concurrence: trial courts should, under supervisory authority, require on-record inquiries and certification of victim notification efforts; prescribed specific steps (reschedule, reserve ruling, notify victim) when notification inadequate |
Key Cases Cited
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishes principle that laws must provide remedies to vindicate rights)
- State v. Thomas, 296 Conn. 375 (2010) (acceptance of guilty plea contingent on hearing from victim to provide meaningful participation)
- Kenna v. United States District Court, 435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing victims’ independent participatory rights and mandamus as potential remedy under federal statute)
- In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 (2015) (exercise of supervisory authority to require judicial canvass to protect rights)
- State v. Barrett, 350 Or. 390 (2011) (approving vacatur/resentencing to remedy victims’ rights violation)