479 P.3d 254
Or.2021Background
- Defendant (Skillicorn) was charged with first‑degree criminal mischief for allegedly intentionally ramming his girlfriend’s parked car; he admitted contact but claimed the truck malfunctioned (accident).
- The state introduced evidence of a prior incident in which defendant drove recklessly in the same neighborhood to rebut his accident defense.
- Trial court admitted the prior‑driving evidence over objection; prosecutor argued it showed that "when he gets angry, he acts out."
- Jury convicted; the Court of Appeals affirmed based on State v. Johns and the doctrine of chances.
- Oregon Supreme Court granted review to decide whether uncharged misconduct may be admitted under the doctrine of chances to support the prosecutor’s propensity‑style argument.
- Court held OEC 404(3) bars propensity use of uncharged misconduct, the doctrine of chances is limited to objective improbability of repeated unusual events (e.g., accidents), Johns was misapplied, the prior‑driving evidence was admitted for propensity purposes in this case (error), and the error was not harmless — convictions reversed and case remanded.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Skillicorn's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether OEC 404(3) permits admitting uncharged misconduct to show propensity (i.e., that defendant likely acted the same way on the charged occasion). | Admissible under the doctrine of chances (non‑propensity relevance). | Prohibited: doctrine of chances applies only to improbable repeated accidents, not deliberate prior acts used to show propensity. | OEC 404(3) prohibits admission to prove propensity; doctrine of chances does not create an exception. |
| Whether the doctrine of chances authorizes using deliberate prior acts to infer intent on the charged occasion. | Johns permits admission; doctrine supports inference that repeated similar acts make accident unlikely. | Doctrine is limited to objective improbability of repeated unusual events (accidents); it cannot be used to bootstrap propensity. | Doctrine of chances is limited to arguments about objective improbability of recurrent unusual events (e.g., repeated accidents); it does not justify propensity inferences from deliberate prior acts. |
| Whether State v. Johns was correctly applied to allow admission of intentional prior acts for intent. | Urged adherence to Johns under stare decisis. | Johns was erroneous to permit propensity reasoning under the guise of the doctrine. | Johns is overruled to the extent it allowed admission of uncharged intentional acts to support a propensity inference. |
| Whether admission of the prior‑driving evidence was harmless error. | Other physical evidence of intent existed (locations/amount of damage); error harmless. | Admission was central to dispute and presented propensity reasoning; prejudicial. | Error was not harmless given centrality and prejudicial propensity use; convictions reversed and remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Johns, 301 Or 535 (1986) (applied doctrine of chances to admit prior intentional act evidence — court here limits/overrules that aspect)
- State v. Williams, 357 Or 1 (2015) (discusses interaction of OEC 404(3) and OEC 404(4) and constitutional concerns about propensity evidence)
- State v. Johnson, 340 Or 319 (2006) (evidence barred when relevance chain depends on character/propensity inference)
- Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (Supreme Court exposition of the rationale for excluding character/propensity evidence)
- People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264 (1901) (historical articulation of the rule disallowing proof of the charged crime by proof of other crimes)