State v. Simpson, 443 P.3d 789

In 1995 a 17-year-old woman was found murdered; DNA from semen on vaginal swabs and bloodied rocks produced a major male profile that matched Joseph Michael Simpson.
Simpson, living in Florida in 2008, was identified via cold-case DNA testing; officers obtained a discarded cigarette for comparison and conducted two video-recorded interviews in Florida.
During the interviews Simpson twice said he wanted to stop talking; officers continued questioning and elicited admissions that he frequented sex workers in Utah and might have picked up the victim, though he denied knowing or murdering her.
At trial DNA experts tied Simpson’s profile to the evidence; Simpson’s defense advanced a DNA-transfer theory and relied on Simpson’s recorded statements to support that theory; two jailhouse informants testified Simpson had confessed.
The jury convicted Simpson of aggravated murder and, in a sentencing phase where mitigation evidence was waived by defense counsel, sentenced him to life without parole.
Simpson appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for (1) failing to move to suppress his recorded statements and (2) failing to present mitigation evidence at sentencing. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Simpson's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress Simpson’s recorded statements	Counsel was deficient for failing to suppress statements made after Simpson unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent; those statements were central to the defense and prejudicial if admitted	Allowing the interviews was reasonable trial strategy because the statements supported the DNA-transfer defense, permitted presentation of denials and demeanor without putting Simpson on the stand, and avoided impeachment risks	Not ineffective: trial counsel reasonably relied on the statements as core defense strategy; no deficient performance shown
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigation evidence at sentencing	Counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence (health issues, 15 years offense-free, employment, family support, juvenile treatment for sexual dysfunction) was deficient and prejudicial	Most alleged mitigation was already before the jury (via Simpson’s allocution and record); additional evidence likely would not have altered sentencing and presenting some topics risked inflaming the jury	Not ineffective: no prejudice shown because omitted mitigation would not likely have changed outcome; counsel’s choices could be reasonable strategy

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance two-prong test)
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (failure to file suppression motion not per se ineffective; strategic reasons may justify)
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (right to effective assistance of counsel)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (difficulty of meeting Strickland standard)
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12 (absence of evidence does not overcome presumption counsel acted reasonably)
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (no simple "nothing to lose" rule in Strickland analysis)
Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (no prejudice where new mitigating evidence would barely alter sentencing profile)
State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92 (Utah case applying Strickland)
State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346 (Utah case on appellate fact presentation)