State v. Simonov
358 Or. 531
| Or. | 2016Background
- Defendant Alen Simonov was convicted of unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV) under ORS 164.135(1)(a) after riding as a passenger in a neighbor’s 1983 Datsun; state evidence showed the brothers took the truck and returned it later; defendant claimed he did not know use exceeded permission his brother had received.
- The indictment alleged a culpable mental state of criminal negligence for the “without consent” element; defendant requested jury instructions requiring that he knew the use was without the owner’s consent.
- Trial court refused defendant’s requested instruction and instead instructed the jury that criminal negligence (failure to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk) as to lack of owner consent was sufficient.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that knowledge is the minimum culpable state for the consent element of UUV.
- The Oregon Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the “without consent” element is conduct (requiring knowledge) or a circumstance (allowing criminal negligence).
- The Supreme Court held that lack of owner consent is part of the essential nature of the proscribed conduct (unauthorized use) and therefore the minimum culpable mental state is knowledge; it affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Simonov) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the “without consent” element of UUV is a circumstance (allowing criminal negligence) or part of the conduct (requiring knowledge) | The owner’s lack of consent is an accessory fact (a circumstance) that accompanies the physical act; statutes classify circumstances to which criminal negligence may apply. | Lack of consent is part of the essential nature of the proscribed conduct (unauthorized use); therefore the minimum mental state is knowledge. | Held: Lack of consent is part of the conduct (the essence of unauthorized use); the minimum culpable mental state is knowledge. |
| Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that criminal negligence sufficed for the consent element | Instruction was correct under ORS 161.115(2) if lack of consent is a circumstance. | Requested knowledge instruction correctly stated law given the element is conduct. | Held: Trial court erred by giving criminal-negligence instruction and failing to give knowledge instruction. |
| Whether the error was reversible | State did not contest prejudice finding below. | Defendant argued instructional error affected the verdict. | Held: Court of Appeals’ prejudice conclusion stands; reversal and remand required. |
| Proper remedy | State urged affirmance of conviction if instruction proper. | Defendant asked for reversal and new trial. | Held: Conviction reversed; case remanded for further proceedings (new trial). |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Barnes, 329 Or 327 (recognizing defendants are entitled to instructions supporting their theory when legally correct and supported by evidence)
- State v. Rutley, 343 Or 368 (discussing culpable mental states and elements in offenses outside the Criminal Code)
- State v. Blanton, 284 Or 591 (material elements generally require culpable mental state)
- State v. Crosby, 342 Or 419 (distinguishing result and circumstance elements; death as a result)
- State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or 486 (analyzing nature of an element in determining culpability requirements)
- State v. Miller, 309 Or 362 (status elements may not require proof of defendant’s mental state)
- Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 344 Or 45 (discussing types of jury-instruction error)
- State v. Jones, 223 Or App 611 (value as circumstance in theft statute)
- State v. Wier, 260 Or App 341 (Court of Appeals holding that criminal negligence suffices for lack-of-consent element in a separate statute)
