State v. Silver
126 Conn. App. 522
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2011Background
- Defendant Mark S. Silver was charged with attempt to commit murder and assault in the first degree after a September 20, 2007 Stratford incident where he allegedly struck the victim with a car and pushed him under a fence.
- Witnesses observed the crash and notified police; Grass and Gosselin separately called 911 describing the driver and vehicle, aiding identification of the defendant.
- Police later arrested Silver; at Bridgeport Hospital he made incriminating statements to Officer Higgins while not having been advised of Miranda rights.
- At trial, the state sought to admit Grass’ and Gosselin’s 911 recordings as spontaneous utterances under the spontaneity/excited utterance doctrine to prove identity and guilt.
- The trial court admitted the 911 recordings and denied suppression of the hospital statements; defense appealed challenging both evidentiary rulings.
- The appellate court affirmed, holding the hospital statements were not the product of custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings, and the 911 calls were admissible as spontaneous utterances under § 8-3(2).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the hospital statement admissible without Miranda warnings? | State argued no custodial interrogation; statements voluntary. | Silver contends custodial interrogation occurred without Miranda warnings. | Admissible; no interrogation occurred. |
| Are Grass and Gosselin's 911 calls admissible as spontaneous utterances under § 8-3(2)? | Calls describe start of events; spontaneous, unfabricated. | Statements not spontaneous; insufficient startling context. | Admissible as spontaneous utterances. |
| Did the court adequately establish a startling occurrence and spontaneity for the 911 calls? | Record shows ongoing startling events; urgency supports spontaneity. | Record lacks explicit 'startling occurrence' labeling. | Record supported a finding of a startling occurrence and spontaneity; no abuse of discretion. |
| If admissibility was improper, was any error harmless given testimonial witnesses? | Testimony corroborated the recordings; error harmless. | Admission could prejudice defendant or rehabilitate witness credibility. | Harmless error; testimony already supported identity and guilt. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361 (2006) (startling occurrence standard for spontaneous utterances in evidence law)
- State v. Torelli, 103 Conn.App. 646 (2007) (excitement and spontaneity test for 8-3(2) ev.)
- State v. Slater, 285 Conn. 162 (2008) (deference to trial court on excited utterance determinations)
- State v. Davis, 109 Conn.App. 187 (2008) (consideration of inability to speak before statements as support for spontaneity)
- State v. Canady, 297 Conn. 322 (2010) (neutral, innocuous questioning not interrogation; Canady as dispositive)
- State v. Kendall, 123 Conn.App. 625 (2010) (911 recordings admissible; framework for admissibility)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (911 statements non-testimonial as nontestimonial utterances)
- State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn.App. 530 (1990) (limitations on spontaneous utterances when emotional distress not evident)
- State v. Nelson, 105 Conn.App. 393 (2008) (stress level and spontaneity in 911 call admissibility)
- State v. Yednock, 14 Conn.App. 333 (1988) (startling occurrence and contemporaneous statements)
- State v. McNair, 54 Conn.App. 807 (1999) (time between event and statement; cautions on reliability)
