State v. Sievers, 299 Kan. 305

Sievers was charged with multiple offenses arising from police attempts to approach his SUV at an intersection.
He appeared for an initial appearance; bond was set on an appearance bond and posted; a preliminary hearing found probable cause.
Arraignment occurred on June 13; a pretrial hearing was set for August 22 and a jury trial for September 30.
Sievers did not attend the August 22 hearing; counsel reported no contact with him since June 13, and a court services officer indicated he stopped reporting.
A bench warrant was issued after bond forfeiture was sought on September 26; counsel sought continuances or withdrawal due to lack of contact; Sievers surrendered September 25 and bond was revoked.
New counsel was appointed in October; the court rescheduled the trial to January 27, 2009; at trial, Sievers was convicted on multiple counts but acquitted of one felony count; the Court of Appeals affirmed most dispositions, and this court granted review to address the speedy-trial issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State violated Sievers’ statutory right to a speedy trial.	Sievers argued the 180-day clock was not tolled properly and that the State failed to bring him to trial within time.	State contends the clock was tolled by Sievers’ fault and conduct, including failure to appear and counsel’s continuances, delaying trial.	No statutory speedy-trial violation; clock tolled for the period attributable to Sievers and delays were properly allocated.
Whether the 35 days from August 22 to September 25 were properly charged to Sievers	Sievers contends those days should not be charged to the State since the delay was caused by his absence and counsel’s inability to contact him.	State argues the delay resulted from Sievers’ own fault and thus stopped the clock against the State.	The 35 days were charged to Sievers as the delay resulted from his fault, so the State’s time remained 110 days rather than 145.
Whether, after surrender on the bench warrant, the State had 110 days to bring Sievers to trial	Sievers claims the remaining time after surrender did not permit trial within the 90-day constraint.	State maintains 110 days remained and continued to run under the original time limit because more than 90 days remained after the waiver.	Yes, 110 days remained; trial within that period did not violate the speedy-trial right.

State v. Thomas, 291 Kan. 676 (2011) (de novo review and standard for statutory speedy-trial issues; clock triggers at arraignment)
State v. Vaughn, 288 Kan. 140 (2009) (time tolling rules for continuances and defendant-fault delays)
State v. Welch, 212 Kan. 180 (1973) (defendant-fault delay when mising trial; 79 days attributed to defendant)
City of Dodge City v. Downing, 251 Kan. 561 (1995) (time to process defendant’s motion to suppress charged to defendant)
State v. Prewett, 246 Kan. 39 (1990) (time to process competency evaluation charged to defendant)