State v. Siers
244 P.3d 15
Wash. Ct. App.2010Background
- Siers was charged with two counts of second-degree assault; the information did not allege any aggravating circumstance.
- The State sought to rely on the good Samaritan aggravator for count 2 to seek an enhanced sentence, but did not amend the information.
- During trial, the jury was instructed on the good Samaritan aggravator for count 2 and found it satisfied in relation to Dan Whitten.
- The trial court sentenced Siers at the high end of the standard range, noting the jury’s finding but not imposing an exceptional sentence.
- Siers appealed, challenging whether an uncharged aggravator could be submitted to the jury and whether the information was constitutionally deficient.
- The Washington Court of Appeals ultimately reversed count 2 on the basis that the information failed to plead an essential element (the aggravator) and remanded without prejudice to refile.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Must aggravating factors be pled in the information? | State argues aggravators need not be in the information. | Siers contends aggravators are essential elements and must be charged. | Powell requires pleading aggravators in the information for post-Blakely cases. |
| Is the failure to amend the information to include the aggravator a reversible error? | State contends no reversible error; information suffices and jury found aggravator. | Siers asserts the uncharged aggravator undermined the verdict and violated notice. | The information omission undermined the jury’s verdict; remedy required is dismissal without prejudice. |
| What is the proper remedy when an uncharged aggravator is submitted to the jury post-Blakely? | State argues no remedy if no exceptional sentence was imposed. | Siers seeks reversal and dismissal without prejudice; under Kjorsvik/Vangerpen, dismissal is proper. | Conviction on the aggravated count is reversed and dismissed without prejudice to refile. |
| Does the failure to plead an aggravator implicate double jeopardy or otherwise affect other enhancements? | State asserts no, given prior rulings on enhancements. | Siers argues properly charging enhancements avoids prejudice and doesn’t create double jeopardy problems. | The double jeopardy issue is resolved in favor of the State’s ability to impose enhancements, per Kelley/Aguirre line; no error in that respect. |
| Does Powell’s framework apply to post-Blakely cases to require aggravators to be charged? | State cites Powell’s framework to require notice in information. | Siers relies on Powell’s concurrent opinions to support charging aggravators in information for a jury trial. | Powell’s framework requires charging aggravators in the information for post-Blakely cases. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Powell, 167 Wash.2d 672 (2009) (aggravating factors must be charged in the information for post-Blakely cases)
- State v. Vangerpen, 125 Wash.2d 782 (1995) (remedy for missing essential element is dismissal without prejudice)
- State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d 93 (1991) (charging documents must include all essential elements)
- State v. McCarty, 140 Wash.2d 420 (2000) (dissent noted the critical equivalence of elements and instructions)
- State v. Frazier, 81 Wash.2d 628 (1972) (due process requires jury determination for enhanced penalties)
- Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (judge may impose within range on uncharged aggravating facts)