154 Conn.App. 45
Conn. App. Ct.2014Background
- On July 7, 2009 Richard Shenkman forcibly abducted his ex-wife Nancy Tyler at gunpoint from downtown Hartford, took her to their South Windsor house, handcuffed her, and held her hostage while communicating with police negotiators.
- During the standoff he threatened to kill Tyler, claimed to have explosives and propane “pockets” in the house, fired his gun inside the house, and ultimately set the house on fire; Tyler escaped and a SWAT operation captured Shenkman after the house burned.
- Shenkman was charged with multiple offenses including first‑degree kidnapping, criminal violation of a protective order, carrying a pistol without a permit, multiple counts of threatening, assault, interfering with officers, attempted assault on public safety personnel, and first‑degree arson.
- He asserted an affirmative defense of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect at trial; the jury rejected that defense and convicted him on all counts, and the court sentenced him to a total effective term of 70 years.
- On appeal Shenkman argued (1) the trial court erred in denying a motion for a bill of particulars (alleging prejudice in preparing a double jeopardy defense), (2) certain convictions violated double jeopardy, and (3) the jury instruction about consequences of an insanity acquittal was misleading.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Shenkman’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Motion for bill of particulars | State provided a detailed oral proffer and long‑form informations; that fairly apprised defendant of the factual bases | Denial prejudiced ability to prepare a double jeopardy defense; particulars should be in writing | Denial was not an abuse of discretion; oral proffer and disclosure sufficed and any ambiguity favors defendant for double jeopardy purposes |
| Double jeopardy: interfering with officer vs attempted assault on public safety personnel | The offenses arose from distinct acts (refusal to release Tyler/ resisting arrest vs firing at SWAT) | Convictions impermissibly impose multiple punishments for same conduct | Affirmed: offenses arose from different acts/transactions, so no double jeopardy violation |
| Double jeopardy: two second‑degree threatening counts (§53a‑62(a)(1) and (2)) | The counts were based on different conduct (physical/imminent threat to Tyler vs verbal threats to police and threats to blow up house) and the statutes have distinct elements | Convictions punish the same offense | Affirmed: different acts and statutory elements; not the same offense |
| Jury instruction on consequences of insanity acquittal (§54‑89a) | Statute requires informing jury of confinement/release provisions; instruction followed model language and clarified court supervision and protection of society | Instruction improperly implied a likelihood of early release, possibly biasing jurors | Affirmed: instruction complied with statute and model language; not reasonably likely to mislead jury about supervision and confinement conditions |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Vumback, 263 Conn. 215 (Conn. 2003) (bill of particulars standard and prejudice requirement)
- State v. Beaulieu, 164 Conn. 620 (Conn. 1973) (oral proffer can satisfy bill of particulars requirement)
- State v. Bernacki, 307 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2012) (two‑step double jeopardy analysis for multiple punishments)
- State v. Quint, 97 Conn. App. 72 (Conn. App. 2006) (ambiguities in charging instrument resolved in defendant’s favor for double jeopardy)
- State v. Wood, 208 Conn. 125 (Conn. 1988) (narrow construction of statute requiring jury be informed of consequences of insanity acquittal)
- Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (U.S. 1969) (Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to states)